US President Donald Trump declared that a US-Iran peace agreement has been reached via a post on Truth Social on Sunday.

The deal with the Islamic Republic of Iran is now complete, Trump stated, while offering congratulations to everyone involved.

Trump also authorized the immediate opening of the Strait of Hormuz without tolls and the prompt lifting of the United States naval blockade.

In an interview with the New York Times following the announcement, Trump indicated that renewed US strikes on Tehran would follow if Iran did not finalize nuclear terms.

Five key factors will shape whether the nuclear agreement is viewed as beneficial or harmful for Israel both in the near term and over the longer horizon.

1. Handling of 60 percent and 20 percent enriched uranium:

The preliminary accord reached over the weekend launches a 60-day period for final talks on nuclear and sanctions matters. Should the 60 percent enriched uranium stock be removed from Iran or diluted under American oversight, the most immediate nuclear risk from the program would be eliminated, as most short-term threats were already addressed by the June 2025 conflict.

Failure to resolve the 60 percent stock would leave Iran with a weaponizable nuclear capability within one to two years. The strong expectation is that this stock will be addressed properly, given that it represents the chief concession Trump sought and a primary justification cited for the early 2026 military action.

Attention should also focus on the 20 percent enriched material. Although less immediately threatening than the 60 percent stock, progress from 3.67 percent to 5 percent to 20 percent marks a notable technical step. Removing or diluting this material remains essential to deny Iran any rapid pathway to a nuclear device.

Time will be required. Even after a final accord is reached in mid-August, weeks or months may pass before the 60 percent material can be secured because of extensive rubble covering the bombed storage sites from the June 2025 strikes by Israel and the United States.

2. Uranium enrichment freeze:

Reports indicate Iran will accept a 15-to-20-year freeze on uranium enrichment. Trump nevertheless stated overnight that limited enrichment at a low level had been permitted.

Given Trump's occasional imprecision on technical details, this point requires close scrutiny. If the understanding is that Iran remains capped at low-level enrichment even after the 15-to-20-year period, the outcome would represent a substantial gain.

Should enrichment at a low level be allowed earlier, the permitted volume and number of operating centrifuges will be decisive. A major flaw of the 2015 Obama-era agreement was the continued operation of roughly 5,000 centrifuges, with thousands more in storage ready for reactivation.

The Jerusalem Post has learned that nearly all such centrifuges were destroyed in June 2025. It is vital that Iran not be permitted to reconstitute this capacity under the cover of a low-level enrichment allowance, since the absence of such a fleet prevents weaponization of uranium.

3. Lebanon withdrawal terms:

Trump and Iran have discussed an Israeli pullback from southern Lebanon. Israel has no strategic need to remain in the area indefinitely and never intended a permanent presence.

Jerusalem seeks to leverage any withdrawal to secure an end to Hezbollah operations in southern Lebanon and possibly broader disarmament measures, including limits on smuggling long-range precision weapons.

Retention of the five small outposts established after the 2023-2024 fighting could also serve as a limited security buffer against future Hezbollah incursions.

Israel would be prudent to hold those positions until Hezbollah's threat is substantially reduced, an outcome not yet in sight. A phased Lebanese withdrawal could additionally facilitate normalization steps with the Lebanese government and further marginalize Hezbollah.

4. Resumption of MABAM operations:

Should a new nuclear accord be reached, Israel should refrain from strikes against Hezbollah until the 60 percent uranium issue is resolved.

Once that threshold is cleared, any Hezbollah attempt to rebuild its arsenal, particularly with long-range precision missiles, should prompt a return to the MABAM doctrine of discreet, targeted airstrikes on smuggling routes in Lebanon and Syria.

Minor rearmament efforts may be tolerated, yet strategic weapons transfers must continue to be disrupted once the uranium stock is removed or diluted.

5. Unstated red line on Iranian ballistic missiles:

Israel cannot permit Iran to accumulate a ballistic-missile inventory large enough to overwhelm its defensive systems.

Although the precise threshold remains unclear, whether 4,000 or 6,000 missiles, and while Israel has accepted roughly 3,000 such weapons to date, Jerusalem must communicate an unambiguous limit to Tehran.

The country has managed an Iranian arsenal of several thousand missiles since the 1990s, yet an uncontrolled expansion beyond defensive capacity cannot be accepted.