On Friday (17 July), the International Criminal Court (ICC) celebrates its 28th anniversary. Even while European governments launch fresh programs to prepare diplomats and officials in accountability measures and the battle against impunity, the institution meant to represent those ideals now confronts its most severe challenge ever.

Europe carries much of the blame for this situation.

Sanctions and uneven responses

The clearest danger to the ICC stems from the Trump administration sanctions targeting its judges and prosecutors, which restrict their financial options and block access to key online tools.

These measures raise legal concerns and harm the autonomy of an institution built to resist such political interference.

The EU has voiced strong opposition. Yet it has avoided triggering its Blocking Statute (Regulation 2271/96), forcing judges and personnel to handle the fallout individually.

Equally concerning is the inconsistent approach shown by the court's own member states.

When Russia attacked Ukraine, 41 countries referred the matter to the ICC in a short time. Support ran high.

However, after prosecutor Karim Khan sought arrest warrants for Israeli prime minister Benjamin Netanyahu and former defence minister Yoav Gallant, many Western nations stayed quiet. Some even debated whether they would enforce the warrants.

States across the Global South reached the expected conclusion.

This inconsistency grew further with the EU and Council of Europe creating a special tribunal aimed only at Russian aggression in Ukraine.

The legal basis makes sense: the ICC lacks full reach on the crime of aggression.

Yet a body focused on one conflict, while aggression in the Middle East and Latin America remains unaddressed, gives critics exactly what they need to claim that international justice acts as a selective Western tool rather than a shared principle.

Limited outcomes and delayed justice

After almost 25 years, the ICC has issued under 15 final rulings. This stands as a notably limited achievement. Cases have extended over long periods, acquittal rates appear unusually elevated, and some rulings have drawn questions from both backers and opponents.

Victim treatment has proven especially difficult. The Katanga matter, though relatively direct, stretched from the 2007 arrest until reparations ended in early 2025, spanning nearly two decades.

Each victim received $250 [€218]. The overall amount for both individual and group reparations reached just below $1m, covered not by Katanga but by Germany, Ireland and the Netherlands via the Trust Fund for Victims.

This amount contrasts sharply with spending on administration, legal teams and specialists.

If a basic case requires twenty years, what can the court truly provide for victims in Gaza or Ukraine, where numbers could reach hundreds of thousands?

The ICC creates high hopes. It lacks the capacity to fulfill them. Supporters have been slow to face this reality.

Internal governance troubles

Beyond outside pressure and weak results, the court has generated its own leadership issues.

In May 2024, claims of sexual misconduct surfaced against prosecutor Khan.

The Bureau of the Assembly of States Parties formed an independent panel of three senior judges to review an inquiry by the United Nations Office of Internal Oversight Services (OIOS).

The panel found unanimously that no misconduct or duty breach was proven.

The Bureau ignored those findings. On 8 June 2026, over two years into the review, it decided by a two-thirds vote to send the matter to the full assembly for serious misconduct claims and suspended Khan right away.

The 125 member states will meet on 24 July to decide his status.

Zero tolerance for sexual misconduct remains essential in any body, above all one focused on justice. Still, a leadership group that sets up a formal review process only to discard its result when inconvenient fails to uphold fair procedure.

Support that addresses real issues

I support the ICC. I served as one of its judges for nine years. Because of that belief, it needs direct engagement that tackles problems rather than praise that hides them.

This requires member states to apply court rulings evenly, no matter who faces charges.

It requires the EU to use its tools to shield judges from sanctions, beyond simple statements. It requires the ASP to follow the same procedural rules it expects from others. And it requires the court to recognize the divide between the hopes it raises, especially for victims, and the outcomes it can achieve.

The ICC can achieve what no other body can: fix personal responsibility for grave crimes, shape international criminal law standards, and give victims an official public record of events. Before Nuremberg, charging a head of state seemed impossible. That idea now stands firm. It merits protection.

Yet as European governments spend on training others in accountability, they should consider a tougher question: what example does Europe itself provide? Preparing future practitioners is worthwhile.

Applying the same rules to one's own partners proves more demanding.