Ideas once dismissed as marginal are now probing the edges of acceptable discourse in European politics.

At the close of May, identitarian activists met in Porto, Portugal, for the second Remigration Summit. The gathering drew prominent voices from the movement across Europe, Canada and the United States, such as Austria's Martin Sellner, Dutch Eva Vlaardingerbroek, Belgium's Dries Van Langenhove, American Gregory Bovino and local host Afonso Goncalves.

Public discussion often lumps all positions past conventional conservatism under the single label of far right. This broad brush hides real divisions inside right-wing circles and blocks a clear evaluation of the distinct threats each group poses to social harmony.

Inside that spectrum, identitarians occupy the outermost position on the far right. Their central claim has shifted over time yet now centers on one core demand: bringing back ethno-cultural uniformity in Europe.

While numerous right-leaning parties across the EU defend stricter border rules on security grounds and target the removal of undocumented migrants or foreign offenders, identitarians push beyond those limits.

They advocate large-scale removals without regard to legal standing and, in certain instances, claim that even long-settled, integrated or locally born citizens with migrant roots should be expelled. This view rests on the notion that these groups clash with an image of Europe as solely white, Western and Christian.

The dangers of image polishing

Similar to several far-right groups in the 2010s, the identitarian movement is now engaged in image polishing. Its outreach now depends on leaders projecting clean, orderly and respectable public personas.

The movement has openly separated itself from neo-Nazi circles that once influenced its thinking.

It also courts academic credibility via projects such as the Institute for Remigration, which frames its positions in scholarly language. Image change is essential to make its ideas seem ordinary. The clearest sign is the swap of mass deportation for remigration, a phrase that implies voluntary departure while hiding the forced nature of the plan.

Shut out of most mainstream outlets, identitarians lean on social platforms including X, Telegram and YouTube. Around them sits a digital network of anonymous accounts that spread their messages and share their material.

Their main worries center on claims of Islamisation in European cities, demographic pressures from migration and falling birth rates, and the supposed medium- and long-term danger of ethnic and cultural replacement for social peace and safety.

Online spaces also let movement figures reach followers of different ages directly, though the core audience stays mostly male. One fresh pattern is rising interest among some gay male supporters, a shift that new studies on the European lavender vote are starting to explore.

How much sway does the movement hold?

The political reach of the identitarian movement differs by country, yet its overall direction points upward.

The Porto summit revealed growing ties to pan-European networks, including connections to parties such as AfD in Germany, FPO in Austria, Vlaams Belang in Belgium, PVV in the Netherlands and activists from many other nations. In several cases these parties already hold realistic chances of entering government or shaping national policy.

In recent months they have recorded positive results in Germany, where AfD surpassed what many saw as its firm support limit near 20 percent and now leads with national backing near 30 percent. It reached this level while openly backing remigration.

In Britain, Reform UK has traced a comparable course and now tops the polls. It too calls for mass removals.

In practice the agenda has advanced further with the new European Citizens Initiative, the Save Europe Act, which backs the remigration idea in Article 3 and had collected 67,000 signatures by 1 June, backed by figures tied to the Remigration Summit.

Ties between identitarians and other far-right parties are mutual yet intricate. Both sides gain from the link. One case is the backing that Fidesz-linked circles have offered to identitarian voices such as Eva Vlaardingerbroek through events like CPAC Hungary and think tanks such as the Danube Institute.

Established far-right parties also profit. Identitarian rhetoric is so extreme in democratic Europe in 2026 that it renders the stances of mainstream far-right groups look more measured, practical and ethically sound.

This counts in a European setting where most governments are tightening migration rules.

In the near term the central issue is how far remigration efforts advance and whether they spark a shift in Europe's right-wing scene. Early signals show that members of the Patriots for Europe group in the European Parliament split on the topic, hinting at possible internal splits.

The result may decide whether remigration shifts from the margins into the platforms of anti-establishment parties across Europe. It will also reveal whether the topic becomes a drag or an asset for parties that increasingly see themselves as ready to govern.

Mainstream parties confront their own challenge. As remigration rises in visibility they must choose how to deal with parties and figures that support it, recalling the tough discussions in Germany about Alternative for Germany and the boundary between normal political rivalry and political extremism.