Debates on democracy across Europe frequently center on elections, institutions, radicalism and legal standards. Less attention goes to the civic arena and the mounting obstacles confronting groups that keep democratic activities alive locally.

For many years the matter of civic room inside the EU was viewed mainly as an external concern tied to expansion and democratic shifts. Ahead of the 2004 enlargement round, substantial EU resources backed NGOs and civil groups focused on democratic reforms, anti-graft efforts, basic rights and equal treatment, seeing them as key supports for democratic strength.

After that wave of accessions involving mostly former communist states, much of this steady backing faded, as though the requirement for a robust and shielded civil society inside the EU had vanished. Numerous groups cautioned that democratic decline, political interference and curbs on civic involvement were not limited to areas outside EU borders. Those cautions are now harder to overlook.

Natacha Kazatchkine, head of the European Civic Forum, shares thoughts on the condition of civic room in Europe and what it shows about the state of European democracy.

How has Europe’s civic room changed lately, what is causing its contraction, and why should regular people pay attention?

There is growing awareness of the value of civic room compared with earlier times. Two decades ago the topic drew little notice. Attention to human rights, democracy and civic room inside the EU tends to arise only once they face clear threats and visible strain.

Developments have occurred. This stood out sharply with Poland and Hungary during 2017-18. The concern went beyond meeting EU rules and touched on adherence to core values. EU bodies saw the need for firmer standards, better oversight tools and backing for groups that defend these values within member countries. In that light the launch of the CERV programme to aid NGOs active on EU values at national and EU levels proved highly important.

The European Civic Forum issued a report on democratic decline in Europe. What new patterns or methods most clearly back this view?

The report confirms democratic decline. As one rights lawyer from Memorial noted provocatively, the critical moment is now and democracy is eroding steadily.

The findings point to several patterns. One is the penalisation of aid to migrants and refugees. This pattern has been recorded yearly and woven into policy. From the early 2000s migration was placed in a separate and charged political category, and many measures first aimed at migration groups later extended to other rights movements.

A further pattern involves limits on protest rights and pressure on public areas during events and discussions. This occurs in several EU countries, yet the EU remains reluctant to tackle questions of assembly freedom and police conduct at rallies. Protest actions have proved effective: in Hungary the ban on Pride last year produced the biggest such event the country had seen and became a wider European stand for core EU values. The same holds for rallies on Gaza, which have kept awareness and pressure alive.

A last pattern is rising efforts to pass laws aimed at NGOs that receive foreign funds. Europe had largely avoided such rules unlike Russia, China and other regions. Even when framed as transparency measures or shields against outside meddling, these laws would stigmatise NGOs and research bodies. This ranks among the gravest risks to civic room today.

Vigilance is essential regarding all current developments. These patterns have been building for years, so governments cannot claim surprise. Vague statements about defending democracy while ignoring facts fall short of responsibility. Borrowing from Simone de Beauvoir, one is not born a democrat but becomes one. Democracy must be built and renewed through wider power relations.

With far-right populism rising, technocratic rule expanding, public disengagement growing and civil groups weakening, which trend worries you most now and why?

Beyond election results and ties between mainstream conservatives and the far right, the shift in institutional power balances stands out. The Scrutiny Working Group in Parliament on foreign-funded NGOs, started by the EPP, illustrates this change.

Concerns are mounting over surveillance tools that can track citizens, NGOs and journalists. Regulatory changes are speeding up with calls for simplification at national and EU levels.

Many advances won by civil society at EU level are being rolled back through this faster law-making style. The mix of speed, reduced debate and weak review of legislative effects is deeply troubling.

The EU: part solution, part problem?

The Forum notes that some EU policies add to the contraction of civic room. While the EU faults democratic slippage abroad, how do its own policies fuel civic curbs?

Migration rules form part of this regulatory push, yet gaps in EU law on anti-discrimination also matter. After the response to George Floyd’s killing and the Black Lives Matter actions, momentum existed for a stronger EU agenda, but that drive has clearly waned.

Rights-based policy work has also slipped. Earlier efforts on procedural rights in criminal cases, such as access to counsel or interpreters, receive little discussion now. Meanwhile economic and market-focused policies pay less heed to citizens and shrink their room for action, often favouring large private interests.

What emerges is both the lack of a firm policy drive to support civil society and citizens’ rights and direct moves against civic room. This drags EU-level democracy downward, and EU bodies share responsibility.

At EU level issues grow in scope: they can attract wider notice, depth and resources, yet they can also turn more divisive. That is occurring now around rules on civic room.

Does Brussels truly heed civil society or treat it as a formality?

The core issue is no longer limited to token consultations, though those still occur. The deeper shortfall is the absence of steady, meaningful dialogue with NGOs during policy design. Civil society has developed alongside EU policies, grown more structured and shown its value as a partner, yet key avenues for democratic input remain closed.

Accountability is also unbalanced. Civil society is asked to supply detailed input on the Recovery and Resilience framework, judicial trends in member states and oversight of EU funds. NGOs sit on national bodies monitoring fund use. Yet when civil society seeks accountability from the EU on follow-up actions, choice of recommendations or progress, answers are often thin.

At the same time narratives that paint NGOs as disruptive influence parts of EU bodies and governments, complicating engagement. The new EU civil society strategy adopted last year is notable for addressing civic room in full, covering participation, impact checks, safeguards and funding. The danger is that civic room again becomes a side issue removed from main policy work.

Some groups label actions against civil society and NGOs a witch hunt. Is that term too harsh?

I see it as a witch hunt. I would ask the European Parliament to spell out to citizens why it qualifies as such and to adopt stances that counter this trend. A witch hunt here means targeting a social group with false accusations, smear efforts, destabilisation and loss of legitimacy to silence them, limit open speech or force alignment with a political line.

That describes the work of the Scrutiny Working Group. It spreads the claim that public funds are misused by groups acting against citizen and government interests and that these bodies are unethical or mishandle money.

NGOs can face corruption or poor management, yet many oversight and accountability systems already operate. In Hungary, when the government moved against NGOs via the NGO law and Stop Soros steps, groups called it a plan to starve and choke civil society.