Days ahead of the Armenian ballot on 7 June, the European Commission stated it stood firmly with Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan and announced an assistance package worth more than €50m.

Weeks after the election, which many in Armenia viewed as flawed, and after opposition figures were detained for seeking to overturn the outcome, Brussels increased its investment pledges toward €2.5bn and moved visa-liberalisation discussions forward.

Inside EU circles the guiding thought has solidified: Pashinyan is shifting Armenia away from Russia.

That single claim now shapes all EU dealings with Yerevan. It is also a strategic mistake that leaves Armenia both less democratic and less secure without reducing Moscow's hold.

Consider the actions this claim has been used to overlook.

Four senior Armenian Apostolic Church figures have faced detention or prosecution, one archbishop spent 344 days in pre-trial custody, and a case was opened against the Catholicos himself.

A businessman was detained shortly after defending the church and remained under pre-trial detention and house arrest for months; parliament then seized his company, a move now challenged in Stockholm arbitration.

Opposition offices and media outlets were raided in the final weeks before the vote. Six registered candidates were arrested the day before polling, and others faced detention after challenging results in the Constitutional Court.

A ruling-party ally asked the electoral commission, 36 hours before voting began and at the prime minister's televised request, to bar the largest opposition party from running.

Unplanned spending, including an unexpected pension rise, was directed at voters before the ballot. At 2am after polls closed, with only a small share of votes counted, victory was declared before results from the capital arrived.

Western monitors recorded many of these events.

Coercion to join ruling-party activities

ODIHR's preliminary report noted pressure on public employees to attend ruling-party events and pre-election distributions that, observers said, undermined equal campaign chances and contradicted OSCE standards. It also cited clear bias by the public broadcaster toward the ruling party, intimidation that discouraged opposition participation, and restricted observer access to result tabulation in 11 of 38 district commissions.

The summary nevertheless called the contest a genuine choice in a well-administered process.

Monitors described the problems yet declared the outcome sound, with local findings overshadowed by the foreign-pressure narrative the West preferred.

The EU's support does not simply accompany this record; it sustains it. Autocrats follow incentives. When each new step, whether jailing a cleric or seizing assets, meets with fresh packages or visa progress from Brussels, repression carries no cost.

Lessons drawn from Georgia

In Georgia, democratic erosion halted the European track and brought sanctions on officials. Armenia's leaders observed and concluded that EU principles can be set aside when geography suits. Nothing weakens European influence faster than the perception that values bend to interests.

Azerbaijan, an outright autocracy courted for energy supplies, illustrates the pattern.

The larger damage is strategic. Armenia borders an Azerbaijan that seized Nagorno-Karabakh by force, carried out ethnic cleansing, and continues to press further claims. Deterrence starts at home through trusted institutions and a population ready to defend the state. A government that imprisons church leaders and engineers majorities cannot rally unity in crisis; a leader reliant on outside backing and unpopular domestically cannot request public sacrifice.

By backing one individual who yields to the adversary and weakens institutions such as the church, military, and courts, the EU is creating the fragile state that invites further pressure. Should Azerbaijan strike again, Brussels will discover its spending secured neither influence in Baku nor resilience in Yerevan.

The underlying assumption also collapses on its own terms. States do not escape Russian influence by copying its model of concentrated power, captured courts, and criminalised opposition. These traits make countries vulnerable to Moscow's return.

Nor does Pashinyan match the profile Brussels assumes. His documented Russian contacts include meetings with the head of Russia's foreign-intelligence service before the Velvet Revolution and a campaign platform pledging no problems with Moscow while labelling critics foreign agents, language borrowed from the Kremlin.

The former Soviet states that permanently left Russia's sphere, Lithuania, Estonia, and Latvia, succeeded through strong institutions: independent courts, free media, and regular peaceful transfers of power. None relied on a single indispensable leader. Personalised geopolitics belongs to the Kremlin. Europe succeeds when it follows its own methods.

None of this requires the EU to abandon Armenia. It requires consistency. Publicly name political prisoners and call for their release or fair trials, as done elsewhere. Tie further payments to rule-of-law benchmarks and concrete reforms. Require full adoption of election-observer recommendations before completing visa liberalisation. Redirect assistance from the current leadership toward institutions Armenians will need after he departs: courts, independent media, and civic monitors.

One million Armenians in 1988

In February 1988 up to a million Armenians gathered in Yerevan's Opera Square in the first large-scale democratic protest of the Soviet collapse, preceding the Baltic Way and the fall of the Berlin Wall.

Armenians did not import their democratic hopes from Europe; they helped shape that part of Europe's history.

The EU must decide whether to support that Armenia, the citizens who built the state, or the leader now dismantling it. Strengthen institutions, not the strongman who lost the support of most voters.

A Europe true to its stated principles would serve as Armenia's strongest partner against both internal autocrats and external threats.