On Monday, a somewhat unkempt Iraqi national in restraints and beige prison attire entered a New York courtroom under escort.

Mohammad Baqer Saad Dawood al-Saadi, aged 32, entered not-guilty pleas on multiple terrorism charges before addressing the judge and prosecutors with gestures. "I am a prisoner of war and pose no danger," he stated. "Your missiles are killing women and children."

Al-Saadi, who risks a life sentence, was then removed from the room.

This short proceeding marks another stage in a remarkable tale that shows no sign of concluding. It features two nations locked in conflict, one of Europe's most prominent terror operations in recent times, an innovative combat method that Western agencies struggle to counter, young minor offenders entangled in global politics, armed groups in Iraq, and the influence of digital platforms in 2026.

Investigators identify al-Saadi as the central figure linking these elements.

The sequence started one week after the combined US-Israeli strike that ignited conflict with Iran, when anonymous posts appeared overnight on Telegram and Snapchat offering covert directives to European terror cells.

Addressing the "Shadow Soldiers," the notes authorized "all silent cells to proceed" and listed a three-letter nine-digit code for designated units or persons.

Fifty-two hours afterward, an improvised explosive detonated near a Liège synagogue in Belgium. Subsequent strikes hit a Rotterdam synagogue and an Amsterdam Jewish school, plus a Bank of New York Mellon branch. The incidents reached Britain on 23 March when footage showed three individuals igniting four ambulances from a Jewish charity in north London.

Overall, 18 incidents occurred from early March through late April, mostly aimed at Jewish educational or religious sites with Britain heavily affected. Though fatalities were avoided, the wave instilled fear in an already vulnerable community and raised alarms among officials.

Many attacks were quickly claimed by a new entity called Harakat Ashab al-Yamin al-Islamia (HAYI), sparking speculation about a fresh Islamist network in Europe akin to Islamic State or al-Qaida.

Legal records indicate HAYI was essentially al-Saadi alone, coordinating from a Baghdad base.

Michael Knights, an Iraqi militia specialist at Horizon Engage in New York, noted al-Saadi joined a Tehran-backed Shia group in his early twenties after the 2003 US invasion of Iraq. He later deployed to Syria to support Bashar al-Assad's forces, where he often overstated his battlefield record.

Al-Saadi also fought Islamic State in Iraq with his unit. Though details remain vague, his social posts point to roles in killings, kidnappings and possibly arms handling.

Clear evidence shows this bold, driven individual maintained strong ties to top Iranian figures, especially in the Revolutionary Guard Corps, the armed branch of the clerical government established in 1979.

His key patron appears to have been Qassem Soleimani, a legendary leader in Shia militancy who created and commanded the Guard's Quds Force for foreign missions. One probe indicates al-Saadi was present during Soleimani's 2020 US drone strike in Iraq and held his mentor's body as he died. Rivals labeled al-Saadi as Soleimani's "brat."

In later years al-Saadi journeyed widely, sharing images from Paris and Malaysia and possibly Austria. Knights described his role in supply chains acquiring drones and parts across Europe and elsewhere.

Entries in al-Saadi's official Iraqi passport record an August 2023 visit to Spain. A year-long Italian visa allowing Schengen travel was issued that year but revoked. He posted that authorities denied him entry while traveling with an official group, hinting some EU services monitored his movements.

"He was known across Europe. If the FBI gathered enough to arrest him, others likely did too," remarked a legal contact familiar with the US case.

Photos place al-Saadi at an Iranian official booth during a major Moscow arms exhibition, possibly in 2024.

Phillip Smyth, a US analyst focused on Iraqi Shia groups, observed: "Moscow may have offered lessons in covert work. Europe could have involved arranging logistics, such as contacts with diplomats in Paris to set up hidden channels."

Back in Iraq, al-Saadi engaged in digital propaganda efforts, a vital part of hybrid warfare tactics seen in Russian operations. He oversaw Telegram networks spreading messages for Iran-linked Shia factions and maintained active personal accounts under his own name.

"In his 30s and based in the Middle East, he conducts much of his existence online, yet shifts between visibility and concealment effectively," Smyth noted.

With the outbreak of war against the US and Israel, some experts think al-Saadi received direct orders from Guard contacts in Tehran after a late-January trip where he met Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Others propose he was kept distant to preserve Iran's deniability.

Either scenario aligns with Iran's pattern of employing proxies for overseas actions its own forces prefer to avoid. Such methods have historically included attacks on Jewish and Israeli targets globally.

US indictments, attorney interviews, independent expert reviews and press accounts have enabled detailed reconstruction of the proxy effort that ensued.

Analysts traced the initiating post on 7 March to active Telegram accounts tied to Iran-supported Iraqi militia plus Snapchat.

"Al-Saadi did not control those channels and did not act solo," explained Julian Lanches of the International Centre for Counter-Terrorism in The Hague, which monitored the messages.

Soon HAYI claims followed attacks, often within minutes and with photos attached.

The US indictment notes phone images from 18 April during a north-west London synagogue arson show al-Saadi and three or four others on a video call displayed on a large screen with the HAYI emblem. One participant instructs in English to grab and hurl a lighter.

Eleven days later, after two Jewish men were knifed in north London, al-Saadi directed an Iraqi Shia militia contact to "post it in the news, important." A HAYI claim quickly appeared on Telegram, though investigators think al-Saadi had no role in that incident. Hours afterward he messaged the contact: "If God grants us success tonight, there will be a shooting at a restaurant."

This planned escalation did not occur. Within hours Turkish agents detained al-Saadi at an Istanbul hotel. Before entering an underground facility he posted a brief video urging his family to "stay resolute."

Two weeks later he was transferred to the US, where officials said he had sought assistance for further Jewish community attacks and discussed targeting Ivanka Trump. Al-Saadi believed his main US contact, presented as a Mexican cartel figure, was genuine rather than an FBI operative.

No further attacks have followed al-Saadi's detention. Analysts expect Tehran to view the effort as a notable achievement while fretting over his potential disclosures, yet not his personal fate.

Al-Saadi was not the sole expendable operative. Dozens in Britain, France and Belgium now face long sentences. Many are minors with prior low-level drug involvement. Numerous recruits came via social media, offered as little as 300 euros for tasks that seemed simple though unlawful. Some appeared unaware of their targets or the risks involved.

Chantal Van den Bosch, counsel for a 17-year-old charged in an Antwerp car firebombing near a Jewish area in March, said her client and an alleged partner believed the act related to crime and narcotics.

"Those who assigned the task knew arrest would follow within 15 minutes - they are being exploited and easily replaced," she stated last week. "This serves only to unsettle a community. Dividing people proves simple."