BySETH J. FRANTZMAN

JULY 8, 2026 16:39

Updated: JULY 8, 2026 16:42

Iran holds several key edges when launching strikes throughout the Gulf. Halting all Iranian threats completely will prove extremely challenging.

During recent exchanges, Iran struck at maritime traffic and launched assaults toward Bahrain and Kuwait. This pattern has repeated across recent months. Despite a truce and memorandum of understanding, Iran persists with its operations while the United States replies in kind.

The core issue remains whether a simple fix exists. Washington faces pressure to increase efforts and devise a method to break the recurring pattern of strikes every week or two.

The Islamic Republic can choose its targets and timing freely. Consequently Iran sets the pace and influences the operational space to a degree. This flexibility to strike at will provides a clear benefit.

Iran benefits because the Gulf serves as its home territory: a roughly 990-kilometer stretch of water that narrows at the Strait of Hormuz, which spans between 40 and 100 km in width.

Numerous small islands dot the Persian Gulf, also called the Arabian Gulf. Approximately 30 of these islands are sizable and fall under Iranian control. This setup grants Iran a significant edge by allowing use of the islands and its extensive shoreline to pressure the surrounding region.

The Gulf covers a vast expanse of roughly 250,000 square kilometers of water. That area exceeds the size of Denmark yet falls short of Norway.

The Norway comparison merits attention. It comes as little surprise that in World War II the German Navy hid vessels among Norwegian fjords. Even as Allied air power grew dominant, German forces could still conceal a smaller fleet in those waters. Multiple strikes were required, for example, to sink the large German battleship Tirpitz, which now lies in a fjord near Hakoya island close to Tromso, Norway.

Focus rests on preventing Iranian missiles from penetrating defenses rather than outright victory

Iran lacks a conventional navy, so locating its vessels poses little difficulty. The real task involves locating Iranian drone and missile launch crews. Iran has increased both the reach and precision of its drones and missiles. This allows launches from as far as 2,000 km and still hit vessels. Iran therefore commands a broad land zone from which to target the Strait. Any effort to neutralize the drone and missile danger appears largely unfeasible. Iran can also deploy swarms of small fast boats, a tactic used previously. These options multiply the challenges.

Most Iranian threats remain manageable. Defenses exist against its drones and missiles. US Navy units and allied forces have demonstrated the capacity to counter such attacks. Therefore the Iranian danger does not lie in winning outright. Instead the concern centers on a handful of drones or missiles slipping through among hundreds launched.

This situation discourages tanker operators from risking the passage or endangering civilian crews. Many crews have already remained stranded in the Gulf for months.

Obtaining insurance for wartime transits through the Strait proves difficult and expensive. The practical risk is not that drones will destroy ships but that transit costs will become unsustainable. Iran understands this reality. It recognizes that it need not prevail in combat, only create the perception of ongoing limited danger. This approach has guided its actions. Iran waits roughly a week, strikes, then eases off before striking again, betting that Gulf nations favor reduced tensions.

Numerous nations operate in the Gulf beyond the United States

Iran recognizes it faces multiple actors. Beyond the US presence, Qatar, Kuwait, Bahrain, the UAE, Saudi Arabia, and Oman all maintain roles. Each nation holds distinct perspectives and priorities.

Oman and Qatar, for example, have maintained relatively stronger relations with Iran.

Kuwait has sought a neutral stance.

Iran regards the United Arab Emirates and Bahrain as aligned with Israel.

The US maintains significant bases in Kuwait, Qatar, Bahrain, and the UAE. These include the naval facility in Bahrain and major air bases in Qatar and the UAE. Current basing arrangements partly stem from the Gulf War and its aftermath. They have evolved due to the 2003 Iraq conflict and the two-decade Afghanistan campaign.

Iran tracks these developments. It notes that the US may consider relocating assets farther from the Gulf to reduce exposure. Iran believes it can pressure the US to withdraw and then persuade certain Gulf states to yield. Gulf nations grow increasingly frustrated with the attacks and seek a resolution.

It remains unclear how the US or Gulf countries will achieve that outcome. Military measures by themselves may fall short. So far the pattern of escalation followed by de-escalation continues, with Iran shaping the rhythm after initial setbacks in the conflict that started on February 28.