ByAMINE AYOUB

JULY 9, 2026 08:31

Updated: JULY 9, 2026 08:47

Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu appeared on Fox News earlier this week to deliver a pointed warning ahead of US President Donald Trump's meeting with Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan during the NATO gathering in Ankara. When questioned about Turkey's efforts to regain entry into the F-35 program, Netanyahu spoke directly. He described Turkey as a government shaped by Muslim Brotherhood ties and warned that supplying it with F-35 aircraft or F110 engines could upset the existing balance that depends on Israeli aerial dominance and US forces in the area.

Trump, seated next to Erdogan on Tuesday, indicated a different inclination. He informed journalists that his team would remove the CAATSA penalties placed after Turkey acquired the Russian S-400 system in 2019, and that returning Ankara's entry to the F-35 lineup was an option under review. For the Turkish leader who has pursued both goals since his air force was removed from the initiative seven years prior, this marked the strongest signal yet from Washington.

Coverage from Ankara will focus heavily on the F-35 developments. Yet for Israeli defense analysts assessing how Turkey might apply greater access to Western systems, the clearest example lies not at the summit table. It unfolds in Libya, where Turkey has used seven years to convert a civil conflict into a showcase of the power projection Netanyahu highlighted.

Seven years shaping Libya's airspace

Turkish Bayraktar TB2 drones arrived in the Libyan conflict in 2019. Within months they halted the advance of Khalifa Haftar's forces toward Tripoli. Targeted attacks on Haftar's tank formations, paired with Turkish jamming systems that disrupted his Russian-provided defenses, shifted a near-collapse for the UN-backed administration into a lasting standoff that persists today in altered forms.

After the drones came personnel, instructors, and lasting infrastructure: a naval station at Misrata and an airbase at Al-Watiya that continue as support hubs and control points for Turkish platforms. In December, Turkey's legislature approved extending this presence for two additional years. Few Turkish overseas military engagements have endured as long.

Self-reliance as a tool for sway

Libya stands apart from standard arms deals because it exposes Turkey's core approach. Over the past decade Ankara has developed its own defense sector, including Baykar drone lines, Aselsan's Koral jamming systems, the TAI KAAN fighter effort, and the MILGEM warship series. The goal has been to reduce reliance on Western suppliers and their attached political strings.

In Libya this self-sufficiency translates into lasting leverage. Forces trained on Turkish gear remain tied to Turkish upkeep agreements and operational methods, creating bonds that persist beyond individual deliveries and that competing powers have found hard to break.

This context changes the current F-35 talks. Turkey no longer bargains from total dependence on US equipment. An F-35 deal would mainly confirm and broaden capabilities Ankara has already developed, proven, and shared on foreign soil.

Shifting support toward Haftar

Turkey's stance has turned more flexible. For most of the last six years Ankara supported only the Tripoli administration against Haftar's eastern forces. That changed starting in 2025. Intelligence chief Ibrahim Kalin met Haftar and his son Saddam in Benghazi last August. By the next summer, satellite images examined by Reuters indicated Turkish TB2 drones had appeared at an airbase under Haftar's control, a step that would have seemed impossible during the 2020 Tripoli siege.

The apparent condition involves approval by the eastern House of Representatives of the 2019 sea boundary deal Ankara reached with Tripoli. That pact crosses Greek and Cypriot interests in the Eastern Mediterranean and has drawn Israeli attention because of its potential effect on offshore gas fields such as Leviathan and Tamar that support Israel's energy sales to Europe.

Ratification had not occurred as of this spring. Still the trend is evident: Turkey now appears ready to equip both sides in Libya's conflict when it serves to protect its sea and energy interests.

This approach mirrors earlier moves. Turkey has balanced sales of TB2s to Morocco with Anka-S drones to Algeria to handle resulting tensions, viewing competing clients as separate income sources rather than conflicting goals.

The core spread concern

Israeli worries center less on the equipment and more on its recipients. Turkey's Libya record shows a steady preference for groups and leaders aligned with Erdogan's political circle, some holding documented Muslim Brotherhood connections, rather than building a single professional Libyan force.

Placing advanced drones and jamming tools with ideologically aligned militias instead of a responsible government matches the spread concerns Israeli officials have voiced about Turkish sales across the region.

This sits alongside the broader regional framework Israel has constructed over five years. The Abraham Accords rest on the idea that Gulf states and other Sunni governments cautious of political Islam will continue coordinating with Israel against Iran and its allies. A Turkey that backs Muslim Brotherhood-linked networks while remaining in NATO adds complications without openly opposing Israel.

That explains why Netanyahu's F-35 comments this week went beyond one aircraft type. Turkey's Libya experience indicates that once Ankara secures a technical advantage it applies that edge to further political and ideological goals alongside national defense needs.

Congress remains divided on Trump's approach. Republican Senator John Cornyn stated Tuesday that he hoped the step would turn out to be an error, while other bipartisan members present in Ankara described the sanctions relief as positive for NATO unity. The divide reflects a long-standing Israeli question: whether Turkey's NATO role outweighs its independent use of weapons in locations such as Libya.

Erdogan has had seven years and two Libyan sides to show how he employs advanced technology once obtained. Jerusalem's current effort is to persuade Washington that the F-35 issue and the Libya record amount to the same underlying matter viewed from separate arenas. Ankara has already shown its pattern. Washington continues to weigh whether it has taken full note.

Amine Ayoub, a fellow at the Middle East Forum, is a policy analyst and writer based in Morocco. Follow him on X: @amineayoubx