Sunni Arab Syrians staged large demonstrations after Friday prayers in the northern Syrian city of Hasakah. Many participants belonged to Arab tribes and arrived from districts around Hasakah, with some traveling from the neighboring Deir al-Zur province in the southeast.

Protesters gathered outside the Abu Bakr al-Siddiq Mosque in Ghweiran, the site where demonstrations started the previous week. Following prayers, they proceeded to Liberation Square, the central plaza, waving the flag of the new Syrian regime. Members of the government's internal security forces joined the march.

Regional media covered the unrest in Hasakah during the past week only briefly, while international outlets largely ignored it. The events remain important because they reveal continuing instability beneath the surface in Syria, even as the new regime tries to project an image of solid and unchallenged control.

Hasakah served as the main city of the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of Northeast Syria before the Assad regime collapsed in December 2024. The Syrian Democratic Forces, which cooperated with the US-led coalition against Islamic State from 2014 to 2019, formed the armed wing of that administration.

After a rapid advance by Damascus forces across the Euphrates in January, the SDF and the administration reached a quick accord to disband. An agreement signed on January 29 formally ended the autonomous administration, and the SDF was officially disbanded on August 26.

Yet although the Kurdish-led authority ended on paper, many of its institutions continued to function in practice. SDF leaders chose to avoid direct confrontation with the new authorities. They recognized that without outside support or protection, after the US withdrawal, such resistance would lead to violence and forceful suppression.

Instead, they aimed to retain as much autonomy as possible while maintaining formal cooperation with central authorities. At the same time, semi-independent Kurdish political groups tied to SDF circles persisted.

This strategy stems from deep mistrust between Kurdish structures and the new authorities, along with the Kurds' wish to adapt to the changed situation and avoid the government-backed sectarian killings seen in the Druze south and Alawi coastal region since the Assad regime fell.

Arab residents seek to end remaining Kurdish autonomous bodies

The recent incidents appear to reflect a resolve among parts of Hasakah's Arab population to accelerate the end of Kurdish-led autonomous structures and to press Damascus for swift, complete, and immediate central control.

A source in the Kurdish authority in Hasakah stated that the situation began about a week earlier when a coordinated social media effort appeared, using fake accounts and posts from certain Syrians living in Europe, especially Germany.

These accounts urged Arab residents of the Ghweiran neighborhood to stage demonstrations and raise the Syrian national flag in the city center under the claim of restoring state authority across all Syrian territory.

The Kurdish governor of Hasakah and local authorities had already planned to raise the Syrian flag in an official ceremony. However, the social media drive continued, inviting people from outside Hasakah city and province to join.

It is notable that local Arab tribal leaders did not take part in the demonstrations. Instead, the crowds consisted mainly of groups of young agitators, including some reportedly linked to the former Islamic State and elements of the former Baathist structure.

During the protests, participants displayed portraits of Saddam Hussein, shouted inflammatory sectarian slogans such as Syria without minorities, and targeted Kurdish national symbols, flags, and banners. These moves seemed designed to provoke a Kurdish response and spark wider ethnic clashes.

No government deterrence or law halts Hasakah tensions

The role of Damascus authorities in the latest events remains unclear. A civilian source in Hasakah noted that there is no deterrence or law from the government to halt the tension in Hasakah. Kurds and Arabs alike began to fear moving within the city, and the risk of kidnapping has risen.

The source from the Hasakah authority suspects a wider political plan behind the events, namely to exploit divisions between Arab and Kurdish communities by mobilizing sections of the Arab tribal population to create conditions for sectarian or ethnic confrontation.

If such tensions grow into widespread violence, Kurdish authorities could face pressure to request intervention by the central government to restore order.

Damascus could then use such a request or the broader security decline as justification for sending additional government forces and gradually taking direct security and administrative control over Hasakah.

This would resemble the approach first considered toward Sweida and its Druze population, where internal instability offered a political and security pretext for expanding central government authority.

A report on the Enab Baladi website, which supports the Damascus authorities, blamed the Kurdish Revolutionary Youth for the tensions. This term refers to a Kurdish youth organization linked to the political groups behind the Syrian Democratic Forces.

According to individuals quoted in the Enab Baladi article, the Revolutionary Youth set up checkpoints in parts of the city and stopped passersby, searched their phones, and treated them in a humiliating way.

According to Abdulrahman al-Hassan, an Arab resident of Ghweiran, the city faced severe tensions because of the Revolutionary Youth conduct. Al-Hassan added that residents saw insufficient action by government security forces to end these practices or establish control throughout the city.

In the period ahead, the stage appears set for further steps by Damascus authorities to end the remaining traces of Kurdish autonomy east of the Euphrates and to extend the reach of the new Islamist regime across the entire area.

Recent experience in southwest Syria shows that such efforts have combined local unrest with the arrival of government-aligned irregular forces and official security units. The coming weeks will show whether a similar effort is now starting in northeast Syria.