ByJONATHAN SPYER

JUNE 20, 2026 16:06

Despite broader regional unrest, Syria has stayed relatively calm in recent months. President Ahmed al-Sharaa's new Sunni Islamist administration works steadily to expand and secure its authority. Its latest key step came in January with a rapid campaign that dismantled the Kurdish-led Autonomous Administration of North-East Syria, which had governed east of the Euphrates since 2019.

Yet the removal of that Kurdish autonomous zone has not produced wider reconciliation among Syria's varied ethnic and sectarian populations. The country stays sharply split along these lines, marked by multiple simmering cold conflicts between minority communities and the new Sunni Arab rulers. International media and Western officials largely overlook these tensions.

Still, the disputes carry weight and could grow sharper later. Three minorities stand out for close attention: the Druze, the Alawites, and the Kurds.

Ethno-sectarian violence in post-Assad Syria

Four major episodes of ethno-sectarian violence have struck Syria since the Assad regime collapsed on December 8, 2024. Large-scale killings of Alawites occurred along the western coast by Sunni armed groups in February and March 2025, triggered after Alawi assaults on a government checkpoint. Druze communities faced attacks from transitional government troops and allied irregulars in late April 2025. An even larger massacre of Druze residents in Sweida province followed in July 2025.

These events, which claimed around 1,700 lives, started with the abduction of a Druze trader by Bedouin and concluded only after heavy violence against Druze civilians prompted Israeli airstrikes that pushed government fighters back. Final clashes erupted between government units and Kurdish Syrian Democratic Forces fighters in January 2026 once the latter lost support from former American partners.

The pattern of sectarian violence runs one way. The newly dominant Sunni Arab majority seeks to assert control and settle scores with other population segments, including the once-powerful Alawites as well as the Druze and Kurds, each of whom faced suppression under the prior Alawi-led Assad system.

Minority reactions depend largely on external geopolitical options. Where real or potential outside allies exist, communities tend to resist more openly. Where such partnerships appear absent, groups often choose temporary calm and adjustment to an unwelcome reality.

The strongest minority pushback against Damascus comes from Syria's Druze population, roughly 4 percent of the total. Thanks to geopolitical factors, the Druze currently hold an enclave that central authorities cannot enter, backed by a de facto Israeli security guarantee.

Calls for separation and closer ties or even annexation to Israel run strong in this zone. Regular protests occur at Karama Square in Sweida city, the Druze heartland, featuring Israeli flags and images of Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu. Views among Syrian Druze on ties with the central government vary across several factions.

Sheikh Hikmat al-Hijri heads the most separatist and openly pro-Israeli current. For practical reasons he advocates a robust, permanent autonomous status for Sweida province rather than outright separation and annexation, though that may remain his underlying goal.

A competing current led by Sheikh Yusuf Jarbou rejects Israeli cooperation and favors closer engagement with Damascus. Other voices, such as that of Sheikh Hammoud al-Hinnawi, occupy a middle ground. Each stream maintains its own armed supporters. For now, government forces stay out of Sweida.

Along the western coast, the formerly dominant Alawi communities, about 12 percent of the population, have yet to mount a unified communal response to the new authorities. Evidence indicates the March 2025 massacres arose partly as an overreaction to attacks on Sharaa's security forces by armed remnants of the old regime.

The retaliation proved harsh and indiscriminate, with Sunni tribal fighters entering the coastal region and targeting civilians. Low-level harassment of Alawites continues, including abductions of young Alawi women.

Alawi communal efforts take two main forms: an Alawite Supreme Council uniting religious and community leaders, and armed networks tied to former regime officials. These include the Syrian Popular Resistance under Miqdad Fatiha, made up of ex-Assad army and security personnel, and the Military Council to Free Syria led by Brigadier-General Ghaith Dala.

Both organizations have launched occasional strikes against government troops in the coastal zone. Many former regime officers now operate from Lebanon while remaining committed to the cause. At present the threat stays limited and latent for Damascus.

Kurdish military, governance engaging in forced integration

Finally, Kurdish military and administrative structures in the northeast face forced integration into the Syrian state after military losses in January. Kurds make up roughly 10 percent of Syrians. The Syrian Democratic Forces still operate and retain a measure of de facto autonomy in the Kurdish core areas of Qamishli, Kobani, and Hasakah.

Progress remains uneven, yet the overall direction points toward eventual absorption of these forces into state structures, with some yet-to-be-determined allowance for Kurdish cultural expression and local governance.

Many questions linger. Limited local administration will probably continue, but the earlier vision of sustained Kurdish rule over wide territories now lies out of reach. Most SDF fighters have joined state security forces, leaving only about 8,000 outside those structures.

Deep Kurdish nationalist feeling persists and could reemerge later in unexpected ways.

The central point about minority ferment in Syria is that, aside from Israeli backing for the Druze, it receives scant international support. The US administration dropped the Kurds abruptly in early 2026. Iran and its partners show little focus on remaining Alawi elements.

The Sharaa government enjoys favor from key US officials on Middle East policy, notably Ambassador Tom Barrack and others aligned with Turkish and Qatari views.

As long as this arrangement holds, the Syrian government's mix of US alignment, partnership with Sunni Islamist and jihadi elements on the ground, and selective use of those forces as policy tools appears likely to continue, harming non-Sunni and non-Arab Syrians.