The encounter between US President Donald Trump and Iraq's incoming prime minister Ali al-Zaidi was framed in Washington as the start of a fresh chapter with Baghdad, one built around petroleum resources, capital inflows and commercial ties as American troops prepare to exit the country.

Underneath the official greetings lie complex challenges: whether Iraq can strengthen links with Washington without upsetting its vital connections to Tehran, and whether fresh energy pathways across Iraq and Syria toward the Mediterranean can form part of a wider plan to lessen reliance on the Strait of Hormuz.

President Trump has reportedly stepped up efforts to persuade Israeli Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu to begin pulling Israeli troops back from Syria and advance pullouts from Lebanon, while proposing that Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa might assist in tackling the Hezbollah challenge.

Collectively these steps appear to signal an American push to transfer more accountability to the central authorities in Baghdad, Damascus and Beirut, cutting direct US military engagement and possibly shrinking Israel's presence outside its own borders.

Whether those governments can wield such authority effectively is far from assured.

Trump highlights Iraq oil ties

At the July 14 White House session the US president commended al-Zaidi and stressed Iraq's petroleum wealth along with growing American corporate participation. He noted fresh oil collaborations taking shape and portrayed upcoming pacts as potentially the biggest of their type.

Al-Zaidi described the trip as the launch of an economic alliance and confirmed that remaining US troops should depart Iraq by September 30. He added that arms ought to rest solely under Iraqi state authority.

Shortly before, al-Zaidi had joined ceremonies marking the funeral in Iraq of Iran's former Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei. He proceeded to Washington even amid reported Iranian efforts to discourage the United States as his initial overseas stop as prime minister.

According to Axios, citing two unnamed US officials, Washington viewed the visit as a sign of a developing Iraq-first stance and hoped al-Zaidi would act against Iran-backed militias. Yet his administration arose from an Iraqi political order in which Tehran-linked factions and armed elements still hold notable sway.

Laura Silvia Battaglia, a Middle East correspondent now based in Baghdad, identifies a strategic reason for the new prime minister to draw nearer to Washington, while cautioning that internal power dynamics will limit his options.

Battaglia told The Media Line that, in her assessment, al-Zaidi would already have chosen to steer Baghdad toward the United States instead of Iran if the choice were solely his.

Closeness to the United States brings improved security, investment inflows, reintegration into global finance, better infrastructure and a revived role as a link between the Gulf and the Mediterranean, she explained.

The obstacle arises when that foreign-policy goal meets Iraq's domestic political framework, where Iran-supported armed factions and allied politicians keep strong influence over security and official choices.

Once home, al-Zaidi will face a difficult path. The militias aim to protect their position and ensure Iran's continued regional reach inside the country, she observed.

In concrete terms those factions will likely oppose any moves by al-Zaidi to limit their political weight, place their weapons under central control or reduce Iraq's strategic bonds with Tehran.

Even in the most favorable case, if they were folded into the central government as secondary forces, their political requests would remain hard to dismiss, especially since the Shiite bloc commands a parliamentary majority, she added.

Battaglia pointed to demands by Iran-backed groups and their political partners to keep sway over security decisions, official posts, state assets and ties with Tehran. Their parliamentary strength, she said, would hinder al-Zaidi from fully subordinating their arms to the state or sharply cutting Iranian influence.

Dr. Tallha Abdulrazaq, an independent analyst focused on Middle Eastern politics and security who has contributed to outlets including TRT World and Middle East Monitor, challenges the notion that al-Zaidi's arrival in Washington itself proves a real Iraqi strategic turn.

It carries little weight, he told The Media Line, noting that comparable pledges from Shiite Islamist politicians have often failed to deliver.

Although al-Zaidi is new to politics, Abdulrazaq said his ascent was backed by the Coordination Framework, a Shiite Islamist alliance led by figures such as Nouri al-Maliki, whom he called Iran's main partner in Baghdad. He noted that President Trump had referenced Maliki when stating he did not want him returned to power, underscoring the implications of Maliki's endorsement of al-Zaidi given his Tehran connections.

For Abdulrazaq the core premise that Baghdad seeks to escape Iranian sway is itself doubtful. He stated that nearly all current power holders in Iraq maintain links to Iran and many gained positions after the 2003 US-led invasion.

There is no avoiding this fact, and efforts to portray Green Zone politicians as unwillingly under Iran's control when they are in fact willing partners reveal how weak the understanding of Iraq has been for nearly twenty-five years since the invasion, he said.

John Keith King, founder of Q Advisory, offers a middle view. Rather than seeing the moment as a sharp Iraqi switch from one side to another, he perceives a possible gradual broadening of Baghdad's partnerships.

The Trump-al-Zaidi meeting matters, yet it should not be read as Iraq suddenly switching camps. It indicates an effort to reshape the US-Iraq bond around investment, energy, commerce and Iraqi state authority as the American military footprint shrinks.

King said Washington clearly regards al-Zaidi as a possible ally in curbing Iranian sway, especially by reinforcing legitimate Iraqi bodies and placing weapons under state authority.

The true measure will be whether the deals reached in Washington lead to visible shifts inside Iraq, he told The Media Line.

Baghdad can adjust its relationships but cannot realistically cut itself off from Tehran. Iran's reach runs through Iraqi political parties, business networks, religious ties and strong armed organizations, while the two nations share a lengthy border and significant commercial links.

In his opinion a workable Iraqi approach would center on diversification rather than confrontation: widening ties with the United States, Turkey, Europe and Gulf states while preserving workable relations with Iran.

Pushing Iraq into an exclusively anti-Iran stance risks destabilizing the country and weakening al-Zaidi, he argued.

The pipeline idea

At the heart of the economic talks lies Iraq's location.

Recent problems in and near the Strait of Hormuz have again highlighted the exposure of nations whose energy shipments depend heavily on that passage. Saudi Arabia and the United Arab Emirates already have routes that let at least some exports avoid the strait. Iraq, however, stays largely tied to its southern terminals and is exploring other export paths.

US envoy Tom Barrack has discussed with Iraqi and Syrian officials, as well as firms including Chevron, the revival of the long-idle Kirkuk-Baniyas pipeline that would move Iraqi crude from the Kirkuk area through Syria to the Mediterranean port of Baniyas.

Additional options are also being examined, including a fresh line from southern Iraq via Haditha that could split toward Syria, Turkey or Jordan. President Trump stated during al-Zaidi's Washington visit that major new oil accords would soon be revealed.

The projects are still under review and would need major funding, security assurances and political alignment before they could deliver real alternative export options.

In Battaglia's view, oil pipelines and a possible restart of the Hejaz Railway could help Iraq present itself not only as an oil supplier but as a geographic bridge connecting the Gulf to the Mediterranean, if political and security conditions support it.

King also sees promise in the pipeline concept yet warns against exaggerating how fast such infrastructure could alter regional energy patterns.

The Hormuz crisis raises Iraq's strategic value because Iraq could supply energy routes to the Mediterranean that avoid the strait. The line through Turkey offers the quicker choice, while a revived route through Syria could add longer-term backup. Still, pipelines through Syria will demand major funding, physical protection, political accords and reliable infrastructure. They cannot replace Iraq's southern export capacity immediately, he said.

For King the project's value extends past energy alone.

The Iraq-Syria pipeline should be seen as both an energy-security effort and a geopolitical tool. Economically it would broaden Iraqi exports and cut exposure to Hormuz disruptions. Strategically it could link Iraq more tightly with Syria, Turkey, Gulf investors and Western markets while reducing Iran's capacity to exploit regional bottlenecks, he said.

Yet King cautioned that framing the infrastructure too openly as an anti-Iran project could endanger its chances. The pipeline must stay commercially sound and Iraqi-driven, he said. If presented mainly as an American tool against Tehran, armed groups could attack it and Iraqi political backing could fade rapidly.

Abdulrazaq remains more doubtful about casting Iraq as an alternative regional energy route.

Theoretically yes, but practically no. Iraq is not truly an alternative energy corridor at all, since it can only move its own oil to Syria and Turkey and holds no sway over global oil shipping lanes, he said. The cause is that Iraq's sole sea access runs through Hormuz itself and that for nations such as Saudi Arabia to begin routing energy across Iraqi land and onward they would need to believe Iraq is no longer under Iran's control, the country that has been striking them since late February.

He saw that prospect as highly improbable, arguing that Iranian influence sits too deeply inside Iraq for neighboring states to overlook, regardless of Baghdad's public statements.

Abdulrazaq said lowering dependence on the Strait of Hormuz is not only a US goal but also a priority for Iraq and, in certain ways, for Iran. He maintained that Iran has long used Iraq as a sanctions-evasion route, while the US Treasury regularly targets Iraqi entities accused of working for Tehran and the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps.

No side gains if Iraq loses access to its main source of economic expansion, Abdulrazaq argued. With a tiny private sector, an oversized public sector, limited industry and innovation, and near-total reliance on energy exports, Iraq is especially exposed to any interruption.