ByYONAH JEREMY BOB

JULY 14, 2026 15:50

Updated: JULY 14, 2026 16:57

The New York Times report on Monday detailing Mossad efforts to recruit and position former Iranian president Mahmoud Ahmadinejad as successor to the current regime sparked fresh debate: Did the Ahmadinejad initiative succeed or collapse?

Foreign accounts, statements from ex-Military Intelligence chief Tamir Hayman, and the Jerusalem Post's Western contacts have established that the Mossad aimed to oust Ayatollah Ali Khamenei in favor of Ahmadinejad.

Earlier New York Times coverage offered speculation later verified by Hayman on PBS, opening the door for the Post to obtain its own confirmations even as Israeli reporters often withhold full details.

Viewed from the outcome, with Ahmadinejad confined to house arrest and the scheme exposed, possibly by U.S. actors aiming to curb future Israeli moves toward regime change in Iran, while the Revolutionary Guard retains power, the effort appears a clear failure that overshadows other recent achievements.

Yet Israeli observers note that different U.S. choices could have altered the entire course.

Hayman explained to PBS that a chain of distinctive operations was planned, with Ahmadinejad as one element. The remaining steps stayed largely secret except for the Kurdish incursion.

When asked why the replacement effort faltered, Hayman pointed to the Kurdish thrust as the essential starting point. Erdogan viewed the Kurds as a direct threat to Turkish stability and persuaded Trump that supporting a Kurdish state ran counter to Ankara's interests, influencing Trump's decision to halt the mission.

U.S. Pioneered Kurdish Strategy Against Iran

Contacts close to former Mossad head David Barnea informed the Post that Washington originated the concept of using Kurds to spark an internal uprising against the Islamic regime. Americans had already employed similar Kurdish forces in 2003 to topple Saddam Hussein in Iraq.

The same Kurdish leaders who helped seize Baghdad, including Massoud Barzani, were those Israel hoped to mobilize against Iran.

Both Iraqi and Iranian Kurdish groups possessed strong combat skills without further preparation. Deploying them in the 2026 conflict would have spared U.S. troops from direct ground involvement, making the approach more palatable in Washington.

Israel stood ready to supply the Kurds with a no-fly zone plus sustained air support to counter any Iranian blocking forces.

Arms provided by the U.S. and Mossad, many redirected after capture from Hamas or Hezbollah, along with Israeli training, left the fighters prepared.

Debate continues over whether Trump blocked the plan due to his own advisers or pressure from Erdogan.

Some Israeli officials questioned the operation's viability from the start.

Mossad personnel countered that successful missions often demand belief, citing prior operations that defied expectations.

Although CIA Director John Ratcliff reportedly opposed the Kurdish move, Mossad sources stated he never conveyed opposition directly to Israelis.

Public reports of CIA arms supplies to the Kurds suggest the agency took steps that could have supported the effort.

Israeli sources blame White House officials for alerting Erdogan, enabling him to reach Trump and block the rollout.

During the conflict the IDF did strike regime and Basij targets in Kurdish regions.

While the IDF later claimed all critical targets were hit, the Post learned that only about 10 percent of those tied to the Kurdish advance were actually struck.

These strikes fell outside overall tallies as they belonged to a separate phase that never fully launched. The plan envisioned drawing in roughly eight million Kurds plus other minorities such as Sunnis and Baluchis to overwhelm the regime.

Blocked Strikes on Energy Sector Hindered Effort

Trump also rejected Israeli attacks on Iran's energy infrastructure and remaining economic assets.

He granted limited flexibility before closing off further action publicly.

One wonders how events might have unfolded had the Kurds advanced, the IDF hit the remaining 90 percent of related targets, and the air force struck deeper into the regime's energy base.

The New York Times suggests Ahmadinejad resisted the extraction attempt and parted ways with his Israeli handlers over the operation and war progress.

Yet a different war trajectory might have kept him aligned.

Would Ahmadinejad have continued opposing the regime under altered conditions?

If so, the story shifts dramatically.

The Mossad would have achieved one of history's most striking recruitments, converting a former adversary into an asset against his own government.

It would have extracted Ahmadinejad at the exact moment needed to aid regime change.

The agency's shortfall would then appear limited to Trump's refusal to permit full execution, meaning its chief misstep was not foreseeing that key segments would be canceled.

Until senior Israeli and American figures speak openly, portions of the account will stay unclear.

Premature verdicts on success or failure therefore remain unwarranted.