BySARAH BEN-NUN

JULY 22, 2026 14:55

The Knesset informed the High Court of Justice that should the revised judge appointment process lead to reduced professional qualifications for Supreme Court selections, the legislators might view this as acceptable in return for improved societal trust and increased diversity within the judiciary.

The dispute centers on legislation altering the nine-person Judicial Selection Committee responsible for naming all judges across Israel.

Currently the panel consists of three Supreme Court justices, two ministers, two MKs, and two Israel Bar Association delegates. Seven votes are needed to name a Supreme Court justice, which compels consensus between political and professional participants.

The revised statute would substitute the two Bar Association delegates with two senior attorneys selected independently by coalition and opposition MKs. Supreme Court selections would need five votes that include backing from both political groups, yet none of the three justices would be required to consent.

Lower-court selections would likewise need five votes but must still secure endorsement from at least one judge, one coalition representative and one opposition representative. The statute is set to activate only with the start of the subsequent Knesset term.

Concerns that revisions may erode judicial autonomy

Opponents, among them Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara, contend the revisions would undermine judicial autonomy by heightening judges' reliance on politicians for selection and advancement. The Knesset and government maintain that neither the coalition nor the opposition could name judges independently and that the revisions would render the courts more reflective of Israeli society.

Those issues featured prominently at the June 21 session before an expanded panel of 11 justices.

Justice Alex Stein inquired what a district court judge seeking promotion to the Supreme Court would need to do under the revised framework, suggesting the judge might have to court politicians and issue decisions they favored.

Supreme Court President Isaac Amit cautioned that future justices could be publicly labeled as coalition or opposition picks, while Justice Yael Willner asked whether the statute's fallback provision would prompt the political groups to skip compromise and await opportunities to advance their preferred candidates.

The government and Knesset submissions, dated Monday and Tuesday respectively, arrived after the court permitted the parties to add arguments following the hearing. The court issued a conditional order requiring them to justify why the statute should not be invalidated.

The core legal issue is not merely whether the new framework is prudent or better, but whether it harms Israel's democratic nature so gravely that the court may nullify part of a Basic Law.

The Knesset maintained that it did not.

“Even if we assume that the professional level of the judges appointed will decline,” it wrote, the amendment embodies the position that “it is appropriate to pay this price in exchange for increasing public confidence in the judicial system and appointing diverse judges.”

The Knesset emphasized that this remained a hypothetical point, not an acknowledgment that appointment quality would drop.

It added that professional skill was not the sole pertinent factor. The committee could weigh how candidates treat litigants, how efficiently they operate, their judicial philosophy, and the requirement for greater social and sectoral variety.

The government likewise contended that evaluating a candidate's outlook was distinct from requiring political allegiance.

A judge's outlook could encompass their stance on individual rights, tradition, the state's role and the readiness of courts to review government actions, it stated. Those perspectives may also shape how judges construe statutes or handle criminal penalties.

The government dismissed the justices' worry that judges might adjust rulings to boost promotion chances, describing the premise as speculative and questioning “the professional integrity and personal independence of Israel's judges.”

Knesset maintains contingency if panel fails to concur

It further portrayed the committee vote as merely the “final stretch” of an extended professional sequence that includes credentials, writing samples, references, interviews and evaluations. Altering committee membership would not eliminate those professional safeguards, it argued.

The Knesset also upheld a contingency process intended to fill Supreme Court openings if the committee cannot reach agreement.

It could be triggered only after two Supreme Court seats became vacant, at least a year had elapsed from the later of the first vacancy or the start of the new Knesset, and the committee had convened yet failed to name replacements.

The justice minister could then initiate the process once during that Knesset's term.

The coalition-side members would propose three candidates, and the remaining committee members would choose one. The opposition-side members would propose another three candidates, and the other members would select a second.

If no candidate was picked from a list within a month, however, the members who submitted that list could select one themselves. If only one side proposed candidates, its candidate could eventually be named alone.

The justices questioned whether that setup would lessen the motivation to compromise, since each political group could ultimately anticipate advancing one of its own candidates.

The Knesset recognized that the mechanism carried drawbacks but stated that leaving Supreme Court seats unfilled for extended periods would be more damaging.

“The sole justification for the existence of the deadlock mechanism, despite its disadvantages, is simple: The Knesset believed that its absence was a worse alternative,” it wrote.

The Knesset argued that forecasts of gridlock or overtly political selections remained unverified. Should those issues arise, it said, the court could review the statute after observing its practical operation.

“A law cannot be invalidated - certainly not a Basic Law - on the basis of unsubstantiated future assumptions,” it wrote.

The government separately repeated this position. Permitting the court to position itself above the constitutional rules enacted by the Knesset would transform “the rule of law” into “the rule of judges,” it argued.

The government also faulted the tone of the June hearing, noting that the justices had treated the politicization of appointments as a settled fact without offering concrete examples the government could address.

It said the remarks reflected a “general spirit of demonization of elected officials.”

Even if the High Court possesses authority to examine Basic Laws, the government maintained that the petitions are premature because the statute will not commence until the next Knesset. The incoming Knesset could keep, modify, or repeal it before the new system begins functioning.

Both the government and Knesset requested that the court reject the petitions.