ByDANIEL WINSTON

JUNE 7, 2026 09:57

Supreme Court President Isaac Amit cautions that attacks on the judiciary endanger public confidence in the legal system.

Attorney-General Gali Baharav-Miara often positions herself as a defender of democratic standards against supposedly risky elected leaders.

Yet neither Justice Amit nor Baharav-Miara appears ready to face a more difficult truth: that rising public frustration with Israel's legal institutions stems less from misinformation or ignorance than from years of judicial and administrative excess.

This outcome follows naturally from prolonged overreach by courts and officials.

Amit's remarks in Eilat reveal an outlook now widespread among the country's legal leaders.

When trust in the courts slips, explanations are sought anywhere but inside the judiciary. If large numbers of Israelis doubt the courts, the assumption is that they were deceived.

If scrutiny grows sharper, the claim follows that democracy faces assault from extreme elements. Citizens who challenge judicial expansion are cast as risks to legal order instead of voices in open debate. This account proves both convenient and self-serving.

No responsible observer supports threats to judges. Democratic life cannot accept harassment of officials. Still, questioning judges does not equal incitement.

Examining court rulings does not undermine democracy. Pushing back against unelected legal power does not threaten the rule of law. Such scrutiny often forms the core of democratic responsibility.

The core issue is that Israel's judiciary increasingly treats resistance to its growing reach as invalid on its face. Rather than exploring why trust declines, it demands the public restore confidence while ignoring the real drivers.

The public observes a court that steps repeatedly into political disputes once settled by votes and laws. It watches legal ideas extended to cover areas once viewed as beyond judicial scope.

Origins of judicial growth

It sees an attorney-general acting less as legal counsel and more as a biased gatekeeper able to block policies backed by elected leaders. Above all, it sees a system wielding great authority while staying shielded from voter oversight. That view arose from direct experience, not online campaigns.

The intellectual sources of this tension trace to the judicial shift led by Aharon Barak.

The idea that every matter falls under judicial review turned the courts from interpreters of law into supervisors of public affairs.

Once political questions turn into legal ones, judges become political figures whether acknowledged or not. The results appear across government.

Ministers find their choices limited. Coalition pacts turn into court contests. Administrative choices invite legal review.

More and more, the edges of elected power are set not by voters or lawmakers but by lawyers, judges, and officials.

This pattern exceeds ordinary democratic checks. It reflects a steady shift of authority from accountable bodies to insulated ones, moving decisions from the electorate toward an elevated judicial group that views voter choice as something to control rather than honor.

Baharav-Miara's actions against National Security Minister Itamar Ben-Gvir highlighted the pattern. Support or opposition for Ben-Gvir matters less than the key issue.

The real question concerns who decides if a minister stays and what authority he holds. In a democracy those choices rest with elected figures answerable to voters, not legal officers free from electoral review.

The Attorney-General's Office increasingly claims an independent governing role. The court increasingly claims oversight of the political process itself.

Neither body was built for such functions.

Amit correctly notes that falsehoods can weaken democracy. Yet democracy also suffers when unelected bodies gather or appear to create powers lacking clear legal grounding or accountability. It suffers when legal figures see themselves as protectors of government against the public rather than servants of it.

The rising loss of faith in Israel's judiciary did not arise from its critics. It arose from a legal system that mistook independence for dominance and review for rule.

Courts gain authority from legitimacy, not votes. That legitimacy rests on public belief that judges apply law rather than embed political views in rulings and expansions.

Each move into political territory uses up some of that legitimacy. Each stretch of judicial power past its usual limits reduces the stock further.

Amit is correct on one point: Israel faces a real test of public trust in its institutions. The answer, however, is not to instruct citizens on their doubts. The answer is for the judiciary to recover the value of restraint.

Israel requires an independent judiciary. It requires judges shielded from threats and pressure. It requires courts able to enforce the law.

What it does not require is a judiciary that acts as though it stands above democratic choice.

The challenge facing the court today is not only one of public words. It is a challenge of legitimacy. And legitimacy, unlike formal power, cannot be ordered. It must be earned.

The writer is an American-Israeli marriage therapist, trainer of therapists, lecturer, author, and volunteer in the IDF reserves, as a MDA medic, in ZAKA, and in the Israel Police Search and Rescue Team.