Israel cannot applaud an Iran deal that leaves key threats intact - editorial

For Israel, the success of any US-Iran deal will be measured not by headlines or market reactions, but by whether Tehran's ability to threaten its neighbors is reduced.

Iranians walk past an anti-Israeli billboard carrying the sentence reading in Farsi, "Israel would not see the next 15 years" erected on the side of a building in Palestine Square in Tehran, on May 28, 2026.

(photo credit: AFP VIA GETTY IMAGES)

ByJPOST EDITORIAL

JUNE 16, 2026 06:00

Updated: JUNE 16, 2026 06:01

The potential agreement between Washington and Tehran could stabilize oil prices, satisfy an administration eager to end conflict, and allow a president to claim he compelled Iran into talks while reopening the Strait of Hormuz.

Israel applies a different standard.

The real measure is whether Iran emerges weaker after the accord. Has its nuclear infrastructure been eliminated? Has its stockpile of enriched uranium been relocated? Have missile and drone capabilities been curtailed? Has Hezbollah been forced to withdraw? Has Israel's operational latitude been maintained?

Current indications remain ambiguous, which raises legitimate concerns.

Cautionary voices arise even from within President Donald Trump's circle: Iran hawks, pro-Israel conservatives, and legislators who endorsed sanctions on Tehran, backed the strikes, and saw the operation as a chance to shift power away from the Islamic Republic.

'A nightmare for Israel'

Sen. Lindsey Graham withheld immediate praise. He cautioned that any accord permitting Iran to menace the Strait of Hormuz or strike Gulf energy facilities would trigger "a major shift of the balance of power in the region" and "over time will be a nightmare for Israel."

This perspective focuses on enduring control of regional intimidation rather than short-term shipping flows.

Graham outlined firm benchmarks: zero enrichment, US oversight of Iran's highly enriched uranium, unrestricted passage through the Strait of Hormuz, termination of Iran's long-range ballistic missile efforts, and cessation of support for militant proxies. He described skepticism that Iran would accept conditions rendering the deal "substantially different than the JCPOA" as "an understatement."

Israel must adopt an equivalent stance.

Sen. Ted Cruz issued a sharper warning: if Iran exits the conflict still flush with funds, still enriching uranium, still advancing toward nuclear arms, and still able to influence the Strait of Hormuz, "that outcome would be a disastrous mistake."

Mark Levin spoke more directly. "A memorandum of understanding, from my perspective, or a final deal will not matter to the Iranian regime," he said. "They will never abide by any of it."

Levin's reasoning reflects Israel's accumulated experience. Iran's leadership, he noted, regards diplomacy "as a last resort, but as a resort to survive."

This prospect demands Israel's attention. Iran need not achieve outright victory. Survival, retention of essential assets, and persuading the international community to label the pause a success would suffice.

The 2015 agreement followed precisely this pattern. Western capitals viewed signatures as decisive change. Tehran viewed them as breathing room.

Ben Shapiro hailed Trump's Iran airstrikes as "the single bravest foreign-policy move of my lifetime."

Such acclaim now sets the benchmark for evaluating the conclusion. An effort presented as decisive resolve cannot conclude with Iran intact, recovering, and retaining its nuclear and regional assets.

Iranian defeat, or survival?

A truce holds value only if it cements Iranian setbacks. It becomes hazardous if it entrenches Iranian endurance.

The proposed 60-day negotiation window poses the greatest risk. Sixty days may appear structured in Washington. In the Middle East, it provides ample opportunity for Iran to reposition resources, restore domestic morale, reshape the narrative, and gauge Washington's appetite for calm. Tehran excels at exploiting pauses. Hezbollah excels at exploiting pauses. Israel has borne the costs of such pauses previously.

Lebanon represents the most pressing concern. Any framework that limits Israeli action while preserving Hezbollah's position is untenable. Northern Israel cannot rely on wording in a US-Iran document for security. Kiryat Shmona, Metula, and the Galilee require Hezbollah's relocation, disarmament, and deterrence.

Trump merits recognition for grasping Iran's threat more clearly than many Western counterparts. He withdrew from the Obama-era accord. He applied pressure. He supported Israel during pivotal junctures.

This history elevates the stakes. Trump should avoid associating his legacy with a diluted version of the error he previously criticized.

Should the arrangement eliminate Iran's nuclear danger, sever its proxy networks, safeguard Israel's freedom to operate, and deny the regime any route to renewed strength, the administration should release the specifics and justify them.

Should it fall short, Israel must withhold endorsement.

Congress should do likewise.