ByYAAKOV KATZ

JULY 24, 2026 14:08

The US-Israel partnership has seldom been tighter on the military front, even as political tensions appear to linger at present.

From the IDF chief of staff downward, nearly every senior officer notes that ties with the US armed forces, especially CENTCOM, stand at an all-time high.

US troops are stationed in Israel on a scale never seen before, with forces positioned at air bases and additional sites nationwide.

Plans are advancing to convert portions of this presence into a lasting arrangement that would feature shared enemy assessments, deeper intelligence exchanges, and broader joint exercises inside Israel and nearby states with American and allied forces.

Yet operational closeness between the two nations contrasts sharply with the political picture now taking shape.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and his cabinet hold limited sway in Washington at this moment, above all on matters involving Iran.

While American forces strike Iran nightly, Israel has been told to remain on the sidelines and has not been asked to participate in operations in the Strait of Hormuz, even though Washington has invited other countries to join.

Vice President JD Vance’s recent remarks on Joe Rogan’s podcast accused Israel of running a personal campaign against him to push the US into expanding the conflict with Iran.

This amounts to a precision strike on the core of the US-Israel alliance.

The statements did not come from a marginal voice or an isolationist lawmaker but from the vice president, a key figure in the MAGA movement and a possible future president.

President Donald Trump has also moved forward with plans to sell fifth-generation F-35 jets to Turkey, positioning Ankara as only the second regional operator of the stealth fighter after Israel.

Wednesday’s signing of a civilian nuclear accord with Saudi Arabia, first presented without ties to the Abraham Accords before Trump clarified a link, reinforces the sense that Israel has been set aside for now.

The F-35 transfer to Turkey will test Israel’s qualitative military edge, though Ankara may receive a version with reduced capabilities compared to Israel’s fleet.

Israel could receive upgrades, new armaments, or other assets to offset the shift, yet the wider strategic picture remains unchanged.

Turkey stands as a major regional power whose leader maintains close ties with Trump.

The Saudi nuclear deal carries similar weight. A civilian program was once viewed as a key incentive to draw Riyadh into normalization with Israel. Although Trump indicated a connection to the Abraham Accords, Riyadh continues to state it will not normalize while Israel remains engaged in Gaza.

Additional developments may lie beneath the surface beyond current public knowledge.

The Abraham Accords themselves were kept to a small circle before their 2020 announcement, so the Saudi nuclear pact could form part of a larger sequence leading to normalization.

At present, however, no such indication exists.

Even if a process were advancing, Israel’s current government, especially ahead of elections, is unlikely to advance meaningful steps with the Palestinians.

Netanyahu cannot risk serious concessions while fighting for political survival.

Any move seen as a concession to the Palestinians could alienate his core supporters.

Recent meetings between Trump and Arab leaders, alongside the absence of a scheduled session with Netanyahu, add to the pattern, though a meeting may occur next week following funeral arrangements for the late Sen. Lindsey Graham.

Lebanese President Joseph Aoun became the first Lebanese head of state to visit the White House in nearly two decades this week, while Iraq’s new prime minister, Ali al-Zaidi, met Trump the week prior.

Earlier this month, Trump met Syrian President Ahmed al-Sharaa, a former al-Qaeda figure, on the margins of the NATO summit in Ankara.

Each encounter can be explained separately, yet together they outline a pattern that excludes Israel.

Israel’s victories, others’ diplomacy

Although Israel may be absent from certain discussions, many regional shifts now under review with Trump would not have occurred without Israel’s actions.

Zaidi is cooperating with the US to reduce Iranian-backed militias in Iraq. Sharaa’s rise to power would likely not have happened without Israel’s weakening of the Iranian axis and Hezbollah in particular.

Aoun would not receive such high-level attention had Israel not reduced Hezbollah’s strength and opened space for the Lebanese state to reassert control.

This opening has produced a pilot program in which the IDF is withdrawing from several southern Lebanese villages to allow the Lebanese Armed Forces to assume responsibility and block Hezbollah’s return.

Over the past three years, Israel has weakened Iran, dismantled much of Hezbollah, contributed to the fall of the Assad regime in Syria, struck the Houthis in Yemen, and severely degraded Hamas in Gaza.

The extent of these changes is hard to overstate.

This raises a clear question: after investing heavily and reshaping the region, why does Israel now seem excluded from the diplomacy and planning that these shifts have enabled?

Whether involving new US ties with Lebanon and Iraq, talks on Iran, the Saudi nuclear deal, Turkey’s F-35 return, or Gaza’s future, Israel increasingly watches others shape the regional order.

The issue is not military irrelevance, as the close CENTCOM cooperation demonstrates the opposite.

The challenge appears political. After a recent meeting between Board of Peace representatives and Netanyahu, it became evident that little progress will occur while Israel remains in an election period.

Gaza remains the most sensitive issue for Netanyahu politically.

Even limited steps, such as allowing aid caravans for temporary shelter, risk being labeled concessions by coalition partners and opponents.

Netanyahu will avoid such risks before an election.

Israel thus faces a difficult situation. Its forces have generated new regional opportunities, yet its political leadership struggles to translate those gains into lasting strategic advantages.

Military strength can weaken foes, destroy infrastructure, and open diplomatic paths, but it cannot alone determine what follows.

That requires political initiative, creativity, and a government able to look past the next election. Without these elements, Israel risks having fought the wars, paid the price, and transformed the region, only for others to shape the new Middle East without it.

The writer is a co-founder of the MEAD Summit, a senior fellow at the Jewish People Policy Institute, and the former editor-in-chief of The Jerusalem Post. His latest book (with Amir Bohbot), While Israel Slept, is a bestseller in the United States.