ByREUTERS

JUNE 20, 2026 09:00

Updated: JUNE 20, 2026 09:02

The emerging framework for an agreement between Washington and Tehran to conclude their conflict carries a notable irony: incentives meant to secure Iranian cooperation could reinforce an opposing power that America and its partners designate as a terrorist organization.

Over many years the Revolutionary Guards expanded their reach despite sanctions, developing extensive business interests in oil production, infrastructure, maritime transport, communications, and harbor facilities.

With Tehran and Washington moving toward negotiations that could release substantial funds and reopen the economy to outside capital, the elite military force appears set to reap significant advantages.

Four senior Iranian sources outlined how the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps is especially well placed to secure a substantial share of proceeds arising from sanctions relief, increased oil shipments, and new foreign investment.

This entrenched position may also hinder progress toward an accord, since the Guards terrorism designation could complicate attempts to normalize economic relations.

IRGC maintains extensive business holdings

Established by Irans late revolutionary leader Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Guards grew stronger under his successor Ayatollah Ali Khamenei by leading regional influence operations and internal security measures.

Since the war started on February 28 with attacks that killed Khamenei, the Guards have further consolidated domestic authority by helping install his son Mojtaba Khamenei as the new supreme leader and have indicated backing for the proposed settlement.

One senior source called the Guards the primary victors of the conflict, noting that after preserving the Islamic system they are positioned to profit most from sanctions removal because they already managed much of Irans sanctions-evasion activity in prior decades.

A spokesperson for the Guards declined to comment.

The interim arrangement announced this week permits waivers for sanctioned oil exports, while a fuller accord could remove remaining restrictions and unlock a 300-billion-dollar fund for reconstruction.

The IRGC does not release financial statements, yet any economic revival would enlarge its already broad commercial footprint, according to a second senior source who cited existing multibillion-dollar trading links, petroleum operations, shipping fleets, and construction projects.

The IRGC engineering division Khatam al-Anbia directs hundreds of associated firms active in major infrastructure and energy initiatives and holds stakes in telecommunications, automobile manufacturing, tourism, and supply-chain services, based on official statements and public records.

The White House did not immediately respond to a request for comment.

Guards positioned to profit from interim accord

Because Iranian investment rules require foreign companies to work with local partners, the large number of IRGC-linked firms positions them as essential intermediaries for investors targeting Irans most profitable industries.

This situation implies that Western firms reentering the Iranian market may end up collaborating with or operating through IRGC-connected entities, even indirectly, exposing them to risks from any sanctions that remain focused on the Guards.

The IRGC controls the levers of the oil sector, so it is impossible to overlook the legal consequences of engaging with them, said Jeremy Paner, a former Treasury Department sanctions investigator now a partner at law firm Hughes Hubbard and Reed.

Even though the interim deal authorizes Iranian oil exports, legal exposure persists for US companies because of the IRGC presence in the background, Paner said. The US Justice Against Sponsors of Terrorism Act, enacted in 2016, permits victims of terrorist acts to pursue litigation against US firms that assist designated terrorist groups such as the IRGC.

If a broader agreement is not reached and sanctions remain, the Guards will still gain from the interim oil-export waivers and can preserve their economic dominance through their established sanctions-evasion expertise, the senior Iranian sources said.

Their commercial expansion accelerated after sanctions tied to Irans nuclear program began in the early 2000s, as they developed channels for oil sales, shipping, and commerce via intermediaries and front companies.

The approach grew more difficult when US President Donald Trump launched a maximum-pressure strategy after withdrawing from the 2015 nuclear agreement and later broadened sanctions during his current term.

Those steps reduced opportunities for sanctions circumvention and raised the expense of maintaining covert networks, a third senior Iranian source said.