Iran's missile force, rather than Gulf defensive systems, drives the region's central security concern - analysis

The discussion surrounding Iran's missile force has returned after claims that it would be unjust to demand Iran surrender its missiles while other regional states maintain comparable systems.

This argument, however, ignores a basic issue: whether the real concern involves defensive missiles held by states protecting their interests or an expansive offensive stockpile assembled over many years that now functions as a vehicle for regional pressure and intimidation.

The situation reveals a clear imbalance. The challenge arises less from an even competition among similar actors and more from a long-standing strategic disparity that Iran has created, leaving neighbors to respond rather than resolve the underlying disparity.

Iran has constructed a large-scale missile effort and incorporated these weapons into its strategic approach, employing them for deterrence, leverage, and signals of influence that extend well beyond its frontiers.

By comparison, Gulf states have spent decades acquiring defensive systems while lacking equivalent means to offset the offensive threat independently.

The greater difficulty lies in how major powers address the matter through leverage over behavior rather than principles of equity. Gulf partners receive repeated calls for restraint because their actions can be shaped more readily.

Iran, having established its missile program as an accepted reality, faces policies of containment, talks, and risk reduction instead of measures to halt the capability at its origin.

The Iranian strikes on Gulf states in the 2026 conflict highlighted this disparity sharply, demonstrating that Gulf nations can face direct missile assaults even when they hold no central role in planning or fighting the war.

The UAE experienced the clearest case, enduring repeated barrages of ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, and drones. These strikes underscored not only the quantity of weapons but also a key message: a prosperous and globally connected Gulf country can become a focal point when Iran aims to increase costs for its opponents.

A further reality surfaced. The attacks exceeded a temporary military episode and illustrated that economic success and international ties provide no guaranteed shield against missile-based pressure. They also confirmed that even advanced Gulf states can face direct targeting when missiles serve to impose political or strategic burdens.

Strategic imbalance

Above all, the 2026 conflict exposed both the extent of the threat and the shortcomings of assumptions that guided regional security planning for years. A common view held that international ties, economic strength, and global integration would lower the chances of direct attack or raise the political price for any aggressor.

Events showed instead that an adversary's possession of substantial offensive means can override many standard political considerations. Viewed this way, the conflict marked a strategic shift confirming that lasting security depends not solely on prosperity or external alliances but on a credible deterrent that makes aggression too costly to pursue.

The conflict's lessons extend beyond military matters to how the threat is understood. This is where inconsistencies in prevailing accounts appear most clearly.

When Iran or its allies attack, attention often centers on controlling escalation and avoiding wider fighting rather than asking why such an offensive arsenal has become an accepted regional element.

Why must the Gulf consistently demonstrate greater restraint even while facing the greatest exposure and bearing the heaviest defense expenses?

An economic aspect also matters greatly. Beyond immediate military effects, Iran relies on a simple attrition approach using lower-cost offensive systems against far more expensive defensive ones.

Each attack wave tests not only air defenses but also financial resources. Gulf states incur both the direct security expenses and the ongoing economic burden of protecting cities, infrastructure, ports, and key installations.

The Gulf therefore ends up financing a skewed form of regional stability while the attacking side enjoys lower costs and greater ability to continue pressure.

Gulf states share some responsibility for delays in developing independent collective deterrence and for extended dependence on outside protection. Yet this does not alter the basic point that the missile imbalance originated with Iran through prolonged military buildup.

Any meaningful discussion of regional security must begin with a clear principle: either coordinated and genuine limits on offensive missile forces across the region, starting with Iran, or open acceptance of Gulf states' right to develop their own deterrent to correct the imbalance.

The issue no longer centers on Gulf efforts to secure themselves but on treating a persistent strategic disparity as an unchangeable condition to which others must adjust.

Anything less amounts not to balanced regional security policy but to diplomatic handling of a chronic imbalance whose security and financial costs fall on the Gulf while others merely address its effects.

The writer is a UAE political analyst and former Federal National Council candidate.