Tehran is applying military pressure to compel Gulf countries to recognize Iranian administration of the strategic Strait of Hormuz, according to a fresh evaluation from the Institute for the Study of War.

The latest strikes on Gulf nations aim to sidestep the purpose of Clause 5 in the memorandum of understanding, which urges talks with Oman and other Persian Gulf states to set future rules for administration and maritime services in the strait under international law.

Parliamentary National Security and Foreign Policy Commission member Alaeddin Boroujerdi stated on Wednesday that commercial ships must transit the strait under Iranian supervision and control, handled specifically by the IRGC Navy.

On Tuesday, Iranian Foreign Ministry Spokesperson Esmail Baghaei argued that Clause 5 affirms Iran’s duty to arrange safe vessel passage.

Baghaei dismissed claims of a targeted Qatari vessel as doubtful and said Iran is moving to take on Hormuz administration duties, adding that vessels ignoring Iranian instructions are to blame for interfering with efforts to ensure safe navigation, the foreign ministry reported.

MoU: the lack of any genuine lasting peace structure in the Gulf

Bahraini analyst Dr Ahmed Alkhuzaie told The Post that Iran’s recent actions against Gulf nations confirm the MoU, designed as a tool for easing tensions, has revealed the absence of any solid peace framework in the Gulf.

The MoU was likely to fail due to built-in weaknesses. It had no start date, clear steps, or firm deadlines from the outset. Without timelines, there were no clear ways to check compliance, making the deal impossible to enforce from the beginning. This was worsened by missing enforcement tools, as the text included no penalties or escalation steps for broken promises, giving Iran no reason to avoid violating the agreement’s intent, he noted.

For Gulf leaders, the MoU was already met with doubt and seen more as a short-term US effort to handle tensions than a true security promise. Iran’s fresh aggression has confirmed these concerns, highlighting US unreliability and placing Washington in a tough spot where it must either risk wider conflict with military action or accept further damage to its standing in the region.

Dr Kristian Alexander, a Dubai-based geopolitical analyst, said Tehran has not fully dropped diplomacy but is now mixing it with pressure to win regional acceptance of its Hormuz claim.

Tehran used the MoU to suggest political backing for its Hormuz position, yet shifted back to maritime strikes as the deal weakened in order to keep its advantage, he said.

As Iran’s key strategic asset, Hormuz is now viewed as the regime’s strongest tool, offering quicker benefits than its nuclear program. Beyond serving as leverage, it also offers a way for the regime to ease its growing economic strains, whether through official transit fees or other means.

Iran seeks to change the strait from an international route into an area of Iranian-run security. This approach is rejected by Washington, Gulf states, and global shipping interests, yet it accounts for Tehran’s pattern of threatening disruption, seeking relief through talks, and then reasserting control when diplomacy stalls, Alexander noted.

Although Iran has launched heavy attacks on Middle Eastern countries, with Bahrain and Kuwait facing the heaviest aerial strikes, Alexander expects Iran to grow more forceful if the MoU fully collapses.

Tehran may avoid a complete formal closure of Hormuz to prevent strong military and diplomatic responses. Instead, it could use measured tactics such as ship inspections, seizures, drone flights, mining threats, higher insurance costs, and pressure on vessels tied to US allies, he forecast.

Naval mines stand out as one of Iran’s strongest asymmetric options. They are cheap to place, hard to spot fast, and can hinder commercial traffic well before hitting any ship. Their value comes less from sinking vessels than from generating doubt, triggering expensive clearance work, raising insurance rates, and discouraging companies from using the strait.

In essence, Iran does not need to strike shipping directly; it only needs to create the threat of danger to increase uncertainty and let the West and neighbors face the resulting economic costs.