A joint Iranian and Hezbollah assault targeting Haifa Bay, with possible hits on civilian vessels near the natural port or gas extraction sites in the Mediterranean, stands among the main dangers Israel must prepare against, according to a fresh evaluation issued by the Alma Research and Education Center last week.

Given a clear readiness to hit key maritime targets via ballistic missiles, drones, cruise missiles, anti-ship weapons, explosive boats and possible underwater or commando actions, the center cautioned that the danger requires serious attention despite Israel's established defenses against each separate threat.

A large share of Israel's energy and water requirements relies on platforms and sites along the Mediterranean coast. Over 70 percent of the nation's electricity comes from natural gas drawn from offshore platforms, while more than half of its water supply stems from desalination plants that treat seawater, so strikes on this infrastructure could prove highly damaging.

Hezbollah retains the ability to interfere with these vital assets, the center stated, even after reductions in its strength. Its shore-to-sea missiles and naval component still present a notable risk, as shown by the drone strike on the Karish field in July 2022.

Although Hezbollah's stockpile now centers on short- and medium-range missiles, the center judged that it keeps some anti-shipping cruise missiles such as the Yakhont and Ghadir, plus anti-shipping ballistic missiles such as the Khalij Fars.

The center noted from open sources that Hezbollah fired the Paveh Iranian cruise missile in March, which landed south of Bekaa in Lebanon. A blocked smuggling bid between Syria and Iraq on July 16 further indicated Hezbollah's effort to obtain parts for this missile type.

Hezbollah sent three drones toward the Karish field, all intercepted. The site had already sparked tension because Lebanon claimed a portion lay in its territory. Former Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah called gas extraction from the field a red line.

To counter the combined threat from the Iranian axis, the center observed that Israel has strengthened several defensive measures. Saar 6 vessels conducted a trial of the Barak LRAD interceptor, the extended-range version of the Barak MX system, aimed at bolstering protection against ballistic missile threats to air and sea targets.

The center added that seaports already benefit from a land-based layered air-defense network including Iron Dome, David's Sling and Arrow 2 and 3, with plans to add laser cannons against drone threats.

The Navy has also started using unmanned underwater vessels in Israel's economic waters to gather maritime intelligence, assess dangers and safeguard strategic assets.

Numerous Fresh Layers in Israel's Defenses Have Not Been Tested Against Coordinated Strikes

Although advanced, the center pointed out that many newly built and planned layers of Israel's defenses have not undergone full testing, so Israel must ready itself for a combined and coordinated strike on several energy and maritime targets at once.

If such an assault merged ballistic missiles, attack drones, cruise missiles, shore-to-sea missiles, explosive boats and suicide drones with electronic interference, it remains unclear whether Israel's defensive layers could still detect and intercept them.

The center also warned of underwater threats to gas infrastructure or access routes.

Besides endangering Israel's water and energy supply, the center noted that seaports are vital for maritime trade, which could face disruption during escalation.

In both the 12-day war in June and in March, Iran struck Israel's ports, gas platforms and oil refineries as explicit wartime targets. To reduce exposure, Israel chose to shut down several platforms including Karish and Leviathan.

Yet the Bazan oil refinery, with a maximum daily output near 26,600 tons of oil and about 70 percent supplied to the domestic market, suffered damage in strikes on March 30 and March 19, showing that the risk to Israel's energy facilities is now a demonstrated capability rather than theory.

While confirming Iran's ability and intent to harm energy infrastructure, the center observed that the conflicts showed Israel could sustain partial continuity of its maritime and energy operations.

Proactive shutdowns, layered defensive responses at sea and ashore, and continued port operations under threat offered positive indications that Israeli infrastructure can function under pressure.

Still, Israel's maritime energy setup depends on a handful of key assets, so any successful strike would strain the system. A Calcalist report in March warned that losing even one platform could cost billions of shekels.

Destroying a Single Platform Could Suffice for Iran

While losing a platform may represent Iran's best outcome, the center cautioned that Tehran could achieve gains merely by forcing a temporary halt in production, alarming civilian crews, tightening marine insurance terms or raising risks to commercial shipping, all of which produce strategic effects.

This matches the outcome in the two recent wars, when Israel itself opted to close facilities to avoid direct hits, showing the threat was viewed as real enough to warrant a deliberate production pause, the center noted.

Over-hardening or preventive shutdowns form part of Iran's approach, the center suggested.

For years the Navy has concentrated on shielding energy grids and routes, building Saar 6 ships to protect the exclusive economic zone and installing advanced aerial and maritime defense systems including C-Dome and MF-STAR radars to counter missile and drone threats to platforms.

Iran's attacks, however, have targeted not only the rigs but also nearby complexes, allowing the threat of an attack and a costly shutdown with greater ease than striking an offshore platform.

The strike on the Bazan complex rather than an offshore rig showed that coastal processing sites, refineries, pipelines and power stations may serve as more reachable targets while remaining equally disruptive.

Haifa and Ashdod ports also rank as key targets for the Iranian axis, since strikes or sustained threats there could interrupt imports of raw materials, fuel, military gear and civilian containers. These ports stayed open during the June war, though imports excluded hazardous materials and extra resources addressed maritime threats.

While Hezbollah and Iran's capabilities mainly threaten Haifa, the center noted that Iran-aligned Houthis in Yemen could also affect Israel's southern city of Eilat.

The Houthi threat to shipping in the Red Sea and Bab al-Mandab Strait has altered shipping patterns, cutting Eilat port activity by more than 90 percent since the Houthis began their campaign against Israel. This led to repeated reports in recent years that the port faced closure due to financial strain.

Another major threat Israel must handle lies in cyberspace. Iran and pro-Iranian actors have claimed operations against energy firms, airports, banks and infrastructure in the Gulf and Israel. Some attacks produced leaks while others tried to breach operational systems.

For Israel's energy and water infrastructure this could mean disruption of cargo-management systems, industrial controls, ship coordination, electricity networks, communications, navigation, AIS and GPS.

The center stressed that these threats require maritime infrastructure to be segmented, backed up, drilled manually, monitored continuously and prepared to function under cyberattack.