ByYONAH JEREMY BOB

JUNE 14, 2026 11:07

Updated: JUNE 14, 2026 15:34

Israelis require a clear assessment regarding the forthcoming Iran agreement along with insight into the parties that gain or lose.

Outcomes hinge entirely on the specific query posed.

When the focus rests on why Israel and the United States have not yet accomplished regime change, all sides emerge defeated except Iran.

When the question centers on why Israel fails to steer negotiations and instead faces marginalization, the setback for Israel proves substantial.

Yet conversations with senior IDF and Mossad leaders reveal that prompt regime change never formed part of the operational plan.

Regime change remained beyond reach given the scope of the present conflict

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu and US President Donald Trump misstepped in the initial phase of hostilities when they enthusiastically elevated regime change to a stated aim and an imminent prospect.

Leading IDF and Mossad figures uniformly state that the ongoing conflict could at best create improved conditions for eventual regime change.

The central objectives of the prior two rounds of fighting with Iran during June 2025 and early 2026 involved delaying the pair of existential dangers by several years: nuclear arms and large stockpiles of ballistic missiles capable of saturating Israeli defensive systems.

When the query asks whether those core objectives were met, the response stands as a clear affirmative.

Evidence appears in the fact that a full year has passed since the June 2025 round, and forecasts from skeptics that the Islamic government would possess a nuclear device within months have been disproven; Iran remains roughly two years away from nuclear capability, and the coming agreement will likely extend that timeline further.

Should Iran never acquire nuclear weapons, historians looking back after twenty-five years will likely attribute credit to Netanyahu for postponing the nuclear danger throughout this interval.

Nevertheless, such an achievement offers limited immediate political benefit amid widespread domestic disappointment over the absence of swift regime change ahead of upcoming elections.

Iran anticipated to relinquish enriched uranium

A complication arises if Trump diverts attention entirely, potentially allowing Iran to retain limited quantities of sixty percent enriched uranium, though indications point toward removal or dilution of that material.

Regarding leverage, once Iran reopens the Strait of Hormuz and the United States retains a portion of its regional forces, Trump gains rather than loses influence to compel Iran to surrender the uranium.

The same dynamic applies to upholding the fifteen to twenty year uranium enrichment suspension. Iran plans over extended horizons. Observers sometimes overlook that although Iran violated portions of the 2015 nuclear accord, it adhered to enrichment caps during the initial four years.

Numerous Israelis correctly express anger that the forthcoming agreement supplies Iran with fresh substantial resources to sustain its government and attempt reconstruction of Hamas and Hezbollah.

Yet a realistic view shows this outcome aligns with the arrangement Trump pursued throughout: elimination of the nuclear danger in return for financial relief.

The notion of regime change, even under Trump, proved fleeting, and he declined to authorize the Mossad backed initiative involving Kurdish Iranians and Iraqis launching a ground operation against the government inside Iranian territory.

Anyone expecting such approval misunderstood Trump character and his reluctance toward protracted, complicated engagements, particularly those involving ground forces.

Remarkably, senior Israeli officials informed The Jerusalem Post on condition of exclusivity that because former US president George Bush backed a comparable action in Iraq during 2003, they anticipated Trump would do likewise in 2026.

These officials required perspective on the differing American mindset immediately after September 11 compared with the America First outlook prevalent in 2026 absent any attacks on US soil.

Does this financial infusion represent negative developments for Israel across dealings with Iran, Hezbollah, and Hamas? Yes.

Yet are the dire predictions of catastrophic consequences overstated? Equally yes.

Israel has not fully overcome any of those adversaries, marking a clear shortfall.

At the same time, Israel has significantly damaged and diminished all three adversaries in manners that resist quick restoration within one or two years and may prove only partially reversible.

Hamas and Hezbollah diminished

Signs increasingly suggest Hamas may pursue a limited disarmament step to permit reconstruction efforts in Gaza to commence.

Should that not occur, the group remains completely isolated from external arms supplies, possesses no rockets, and holds essentially no capacity to endanger Israeli civilians beyond forward IDF positions in Gaza, having been reduced from a capable national military force to a guerrilla entity reminiscent of the 1990s.

Hezbollah has declined from one hundred fifty thousand rockets to perhaps as few as ten thousand. The group can still menace northern Israel but not the remainder of the country, and even northern threats operate at reduced intensity. Israel may leverage a withdrawal from most of southern Lebanon to establish normalized ties with the Lebanese government, advancing a historic sequence that could further marginalize Hezbollah beyond any point since its inception.

For more than eighteen months Hezbollah has been largely severed from Iranian resupply routes by land because the Syrian government is now Sunni led and equally opposed to Iran as Israel.

None of these developments imply that Hamas and Hezbollah will disappear, and both continue to pose risks, Hezbollah in particular.

Nevertheless, additional Iranian funding will not enable rapid recovery of prior strength and reach, especially since Israel will not permit rearmament with long range systems even following a ceasefire or potential partial withdrawal.

Iran likewise will not regain its former position rapidly.

In forthcoming phases of the anticipated agreement, Iran is projected to receive access to previously frozen assets valued between six billion and twenty four billion dollars, portions of which may tie to nuclear milestones.

The country suffered losses amounting to hundreds of billions of dollars across its defense and related industries during recent hostilities.

The principal remaining concern centers on the ballistic missile program.

The danger posed by overwhelming missile quantities has been deferred by several years.

However the agreement imposes no restrictions preventing Iran from rebuilding its inventory from the current five hundred to one thousand missiles back toward the pre war total of three thousand or potentially expanding to five thousand or six thousand, the very scenario that prompted Israel to initiate renewed conflict in 2026.

Had Israel coordinated diplomatic efforts more effectively, including greater inclusion of European partners in key choices and planning, an upper bound on missile numbers and ranges might have been incorporated, given that Europeans face earlier exposure to Iranian ballistic missiles than the United States since they lie only marginally beyond current Iranian reach while striking the US would require additional years for Iran to develop intercontinental capabilities.

This aspect constitutes Israel largest and least discussed concession within the agreement.

The sole yet straightforward remedy for Israel involves conveying a direct message to Iranian authorities that Israel will honor the ceasefire until Iran surpasses whatever missile threshold the IDF considers unmanageable, at which point Israel will respond with renewed strikes.

All of these considerations overlook one of the most significant current risks to Israel: substantial erosion of backing from allies in the United States, Europe, and certain Arab states in the Middle East. One benefit of concluding years of conflict or securing an extended pause lies in the opportunity to address those relationships.

This nuanced evaluation of gains and setbacks does not reflect the current outlook of most Israelis, who were presented with the revised notion that following October 7 a conflict lasting more than two years against Iran using air power alone could neutralize every threat facing the Jewish state.

Eventually, however, it will prove prudent for Israelis to concentrate on the security improvements attained while recognizing the foremost future risks: resurgence of the Iranian ballistic missile danger and Israel declining diplomatic standing, which over time will carry serious military consequences unless the trend is corrected.