ByMAJ.-GEN. (RET.) AMOS YADLIN

JULY 30, 2026 08:16

Updated: JULY 30, 2026 10:01

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's recent trip to Washington stood out mostly for the missing joint announcement and photo session with US President Donald Trump. These moments matter a great deal to Netanyahu before Israeli elections, yet their absence shows the White House growing wary of Israeli efforts to shape its Iran approach.

The talks occurred amid the practical ceasefire between Iran and the United States. The recent quiet does not signal the end of tensions. Instead it points to a deadlock. Neither side wants to accept a limited clash from differing readings of the memorandum, but both avoid the cost of full war.

Two views compete in each capital. In Tehran one group wants a deal to ease sanctions and protect the regime. The IRGC and others cling to a victory story and think Iran can gain military edges over the US and Gulf states to boost its position.

Washington faces a parallel split. Negotiation supporters want to end the fight and limit damage, worried that more escalation will hurt Trump politically and economically. Hardliners say only more force will improve any deal. They seek limited gains to strengthen US leverage without full war.

The power balance differs. Iran has several decision centers, yet the IRGC strongly shapes compromise limits and controls missile and drone launches.

In Washington the choice rests mostly with Trump alone. The pause could allow talks to advance or simply pause before another solo call, especially if Iran insists on its own MOU reading at the table.

A deeper issue stands out: the US finds Iranian choices hard to read, while Iran knows US weak points well, including dislike of long wars, energy price fears, domestic politics, and casualty concerns.

Tehran need not beat the US outright. It only needs to raise costs slowly until Washington seeks an exit. From Tehran's view, regime survival counts as success.

After early understandings fell apart, pro-deal voices in Washington seemed weaker and Trump appeared set to escalate. Yet Trump, despite warnings, wants to avoid endless conflict. Some label this pattern TACO, noting he threatens, pushes higher, then seeks a deal he can call a win.

Though often critical, the tag captures Trump's core style: using power without long war costs. US opinion gives no free pass either, with polls showing desire to end the effort, doubts on continued fighting, and rising congressional questions over unclear goals.

The Hormuz campaign may have pushed Iran toward some give. Military action, the sea blockade, and infrastructure risks have led Tehran to use Oman and others for talks on the strait and wider deals. The catch remains: the June memorandum is less an MOU than an MOM, a memorandum of misunderstanding.

The text has 14 clauses and a 60-day window for navigation, nuclear, missile, and sanctions talks, but vague wording lets each side claim a different deal. Washington sees free navigation as open passage. Tehran may mean passage only under its terms.

The US treats the memo as a path to a nuclear accord. Iran may see it as a ceasefire tool for relief and talks without giving up key assets. The same vagueness that allowed signing now blocks smooth use and risks new clashes.

From Tehran and Washington to Jerusalem

The main risk for Israel is that the fight becomes known as the Hormuz War. Once navigation resumes, even partly, strong pressure will hit Trump to claim success and move on.

Israel's real threat is the nuclear program, not the strait. Hormuz results will affect US standing versus China and Russia and its hold on Tehran, yet the sea issue must not replace the nuclear file.

Israel's task is to stop Hormuz success from replacing nuclear pressure. Plainly, Israel is not central now. Even if Netanyahu sees political or security reasons for new strikes, extra goals are unclear. Past hits did not remove the regime or Iran's recovery power.

Trump is unlikely to let Israel pull him into unwanted action. Reports show Israel sits outside current diplomacy while Oman, Qatar, and Arab states lead.

Netanyahu's influence in Washington is lower now. The regime-change effort fell short, the war lacks US support, the White House fears energy shocks, and Trump's regional ties run more through Riyadh, Doha, Ankara, and Muscat than Jerusalem.

Direct Israeli action fits only two cases: direct Iranian attack on Israel, or a US request for specific help. Then sharing intelligence, defense, and operations to weaken Iran's strait hold and aid the coalition makes sense.

Israel gains nothing from starting a Hormuz war, especially when nuclear site strikes lack clear payoff. It could even force Israel to back a weak deal later simply for having joined.

Israel's best role is quiet diplomacy: guiding Trump back to the nuclear issue. It should back a wide coalition to guard energy routes so the US does not act alone, while ensuring any Hormuz deal does not sideline the nuclear threat.

Jerusalem must warn against a thin deal made only for a Trump victory image and Iranian breathing room, without real checks, lasting limits, or fixes for Iran's breakout ability.

If a solid deal is impossible, Israel fares better with no agreement and no war: avoiding full conflict while keeping economic, diplomatic, and tech pressure on Tehran. This path beats a global energy crisis, boosted extremists on both sides, and vague pacts. It also beats a poor deal that gives the regime time, funds, and cover without closing the bomb path.

Israel is not losing the fight outright. It simply sits off the field where choices happen. This shows a real break in the US alliance, yet new strikes will not repair it. Rebuilding trust, showing clear value to US interests, and restoring political, tech, and regional ties matter more.

Israel keeps one firm red line needing full freedom: an Iranian rush for a nuclear weapon. If Tehran shifts from pressure and threshold status to a confirmed fast push for a bomb, Israel must be ready to act alone.

Until then Israel must avoid mixing presence with influence or action with strategy. In the Hormuz fight Israel has no independent role. In stopping a nuclear Iran its duty cannot be replaced.