ByHERB KEINON

JUNE 8, 2026 16:20

Updated: JUNE 8, 2026 16:58

On Monday morning, 59 years after the Six-Day War, Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu confronted his own version of a Levi Eshkol decision.

On June 3, 1967, amid rising tensions in the Middle East after Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser closed the Straits of Tiran, removed UN observers from Sinai, and vowed to push Israel into the sea, then-prime minister Levi Eshkol received a message from US president Lyndon Johnson urging restraint against any preemptive move.

"I must stress the importance for Israel to avoid initiating hostilities," Johnson, known for his support of Israel, wrote. "Israel will not stand alone unless it chooses to proceed independently. We cannot envision that it will take this step."

Put simply, as the message has often been summarized, Johnson warned Eshkol that acting alone would mean standing alone.

Eshkol considered the note and then, two days later, chose to proceed independently. Israel launched a preemptive strike.

Why? Because Eshkol saw an existential danger to Israel and placed national security above the preferences of even its strongest partner.

Netanyahu's take on the Eshkol challenge

Netanyahu encountered a similar choice on Sunday night after Iran sent ballistic missiles toward Israel and US President Donald Trump, through remarks to Israeli reporters, called on Israel to hold back. He later held a direct call with Netanyahu, though details of that exchange stayed private.

Yet what Israelis, the region, and the wider world heard was the US president advising Netanyahu against a counterstrike, with the results of ignoring that advice left open.

Netanyahu ordered a response anyway.

In this action, he joined a series of Israeli leaders who, at critical junctures, determined that national priorities demanded going against Washington.

The examples are well known. David Ben-Gurion proclaimed independence in 1948 despite strong resistance from the State Department. Eshkol began the Six Day War despite Johnson's caution.

Menachem Begin directed the attack on Iraq's Osirak reactor in 1981, aware that former US president Ronald Reagan would likely object. Reagan did object and paused shipments of four F-16 jets for a time.

A similar situation arose in 2002 when Ariel Sharon pressed ahead with Operation Defensive Shield and the push into Jenin after the Park Hotel attack despite calls from former US president George W. Bush to withdraw "without delay."

It surfaced once more in 2007 when Ehud Olmert directed the strike on Syria's nuclear reactor after Bush indicated a preference for diplomatic handling.

In every instance, the Israeli leader judged that Israel's needs outweighed US concerns.

The key question is why Netanyahu saw Sunday's events in the same light. Unlike Eshkol in 1967, Israel did not face an immediate existential danger.

The reason lies in the fact that no response would have let Iran set a fresh strategic pattern, shown weakness across the area, and carried notable domestic political weight.

What new pattern was Tehran seeking to build? The connection between Lebanon and Iran. Iran was placing itself as Hezbollah's defender and indicating that future Israeli moves against Hezbollah in Beirut would bring a direct Iranian reply.

Iran's proxy approach reversed

As Iran specialist Raz Zimmt observed in a post on X/Twitter, this marks a full reversal of Iran's usual proxy strategy. The proxies were meant to shield Iran.

The idea held that if Israel ever hit Iran's nuclear sites, Hezbollah and other proxies would unleash attacks on Israel. Instead, the reverse seems underway: Iran now finds itself needing to shield the proxies.

Nor is this the first occasion when one of Iran's partners has sought to shape Israeli actions.

The move brings to mind Hamas's efforts in 2021 to draw boundaries around Sheikh Jarrah and the Temple Mount.

Hamas cautioned that if Israel removed residents from Sheikh Jarrah or conducted what it termed provocations on the Temple Mount, rockets would come. On Jerusalem Day in 2021, it even set a deadline tied to the Flag March.

Israel went ahead with the march. Hamas launched rockets. Israel answered by expanding Operation Guardian of the Walls, which had started two days prior.

The signal then was plain: no militant group will shape Israeli policy in its capital - do not tie Gaza to Jerusalem.

The signal now directed at Iran is identical: no militant state will shape Israeli security policy inside its borders - do not tie Iran to Lebanon.

Netanyahu believed he needed to move to stop that new pattern from settling in.

He also had to display resolve. Throughout the region, governments, groups, and publics watched Sunday night to gauge Israel's reply.

As former strategic affairs minister Ron Dermer has maintained for years, one factor behind the Abraham Accords nations drawing nearer to Israel in the later part of the previous decade was their view that Israel would pursue its own goals even when that meant opposing Washington.

Dermer, who served as Israel's ambassador to the United States then, has often highlighted Netanyahu's 2015 address to Congress, given against former US president Barack Obama's preferences, as proof of that independence.

In his account, that readiness to act on its own persuaded many regional players that Israel was committed, dependable, and ready to safeguard its interests even if it meant differing from the US president.

Had Netanyahu accepted Trump's appeal on Sunday and avoided a reply after Iran fired 11 ballistic missiles, the reverse message would have gone out: that Israel is limited, cautious, and ultimately reluctant to question American instructions.

That is rarely a trait valued in the Middle East.

And there is also the political side.

With Netanyahu's political opponents - Naftali Bennett, Yair Lapid, Avigdor Liberman, and Gadi Eisenkot - often depicting him as Trump's follower, not replying to the Iranian attack would have brought a steep political price.

Replying will likely not gain him many supporters. Not replying, though, might have lost him some.

Especially since his critics would surely have recalled a speech he gave to the Knesset on June 12, 2021, in his parting remarks after losing office.

Criticizing the incoming Bennett-Lapid government, Netanyahu claimed they would lack the ability to resist American pressure as he had done often, particularly on Obama's Iran approach.

"An Israeli prime minister must be prepared to say no to the president of the United States on issues that threaten our survival," he stated.

On Sunday, Netanyahu did precisely that.

At least for the present.