ByZV KLEIN

MAY 15, 2024 06:00

Roman Gofman has yet to step into the Mossad chief's role, yet the typical Israeli backlash has begun: Ex-officials issue cautions, legal experts raise alarms, and pundits declare the risks unprecedented.

Certain cautions merit attention. Israel's intelligence bodies must remain tools of the state, not extensions of any prime minister, political group, leader, or judicial bloc. This democratic safeguard is vital amid constant threats.

Yet opposition to Gofman repeatedly boils down to a single point: His career did not begin within the Mossad.

The Senior Appointments Advisory Committee endorsed Gofman as the incoming Mossad head, set to succeed David Barnea this June, following Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's December nomination.

A seasoned IDF general, Gofman shone during the October 7 atrocities, hurrying southward to aid besieged communities.

Some reports cast the pick as Netanyahu's risky move, skipping agency veterans for an outsider viewed by detractors as politically aligned, though backers praised his innovative and bold operational style. Others highlighted the absence of intelligence experience.

This worry holds weight. The Mossad differs from a tank unit. Espionage demands unique traditions, skills, restraint, connections, and subtle perils. A top battlefield leader does not inherently excel in intelligence command.

However, lacking Mossad roots does not equal incompetence, as the organization's past demonstrates.

Previous Mossad heads from military backgrounds

Zvi Zamir, former Southern Command leader with key IDF roles, directed the Mossad from 1968 to 1974.

Meir Amit, ascending to major-general before entering intelligence, led Military Intelligence then the Mossad starting in 1963. His era yielded iconic missions, like Eli Cohen's infiltration of Syria's elite.

Yitzhak Hofi commanded Northern Command in the Yom Kippur War, acted as chief of staff briefly, and steered the Mossad for nine years afterward.

Meir Dagan, among the agency's most impactful chiefs, brought extensive IDF service and was tapped by Ariel Sharon in 2002.

Such examples do not guarantee Gofman's success. They do show that rejecting him solely for external origins misses the mark.

A tougher critique focuses on politics. As Netanyahu's military secretary, Gofman warrants deeper examination of that tie.

This position exposes one to a leader's rawest hours, fostering deep trust and access to core national secrets. In Israel's polarized landscape, where courts, media, and security organs form battle lines, such closeness matters greatly.

Yet nearness does not imply blind allegiance. Past military secretaries have openly clashed with their former bosses.

Gofman's true measure lies in his readiness to defy Netanyahu decisively - documented, witnessed, career-risking. Every Mossad director faces this, insiders included.

The October 7 horrors reshaped this discussion. Politicians faltered. Security systems crumbled. Intelligence missed cues. Hamas struck unchecked; borders proved vulnerable.

Ideas of restraint, control, and the flawed 'conceptzia' - believing Hamas could be placated - shattered amid slaughter, kidnappings, and trauma.

Thus, insisting on conventional profiles from standard paths with institutional nods risks complacency over insight. It can mask self-preservation as expertise.

The veteran security cadre built credibility over decades but demands review after October 7, 2023.

The separate clash over David Zini's Shin Bet candidacy involves distinct legal matters, like a court voiding Ronen Bar's ouster.

These stand alone, yet combined, they suggest an unofficial veto power by Israel's entrenched security elite, deeming outsiders unfit from the outset.

This view resonates widely, frustrating center-right and some centrist Israelis weary of repetitive resistance: Attorney-general blocks, ex-leaders alert, pundits dramatize, officials chime in, all casting fights as democracy's brink.

Genuine alerts exist. Constant alarms dull sensitivity, eroding credibility when true perils arise.

Ex-intelligence leaders merit deference for their unique insights. Yet today, they engage publicly - via media, petitions, leaks - so their views inform, not dictate, discourse.

Probe Gofman rigorously: His PM ties, Mossad inexperience, independence pledge. Deny none. But vetting must reflect analysis, not knee-jerk opposition.

Post-October 7 Israel craves leaders to challenge stagnant norms, blending rigor with fresh urgency, drawing from combat lessons to interrogate overlooked routines.

This pragmatism acknowledges outsider pitfalls - ignorance, overconfidence - alongside insider flops that exacted dear costs.

Gofman could prove brilliant or flawed, as with any pick. Israel must resist letting familiar critics bar non-club members from leadership.

After October 7, the establishment yields final say no more.