Israel, US, and Lebanon hold separate expectations for pilot zones amid Hezbollah concerns - analysis

Lebanon, Israel, and the US all endorse Lebanese army operations in southern pilot zones, yet each maintains unique definitions of achievement and strategies toward Hezbollah.

BySETH J. FRANTZMAN

JULY 21, 2026 16:29

Updated: JULY 21, 2026 17:18

A noticeable divide exists between Beirut, Washington, and Jerusalem on the intended results of Lebanese Armed Forces deployment in the suggested pilot zones of southern Lebanon. Although all three endorse greater LAF involvement in principle, their underlying aims for the effort diverge markedly.

On July 20, the US Department of State noted that pilot zone operations had commenced in Froun, Srifa, and Zawtar Al-Gharbiya under the Trilateral Framework and Military Coordination Group oversight. This step followed recent Israel-Lebanon talks in Rome. The United States pledged ongoing collaboration to reach a positive resolution. Lebanon's President Joseph Aoun is currently visiting the US for talks with President Donald Trump and State Department officials.

Beirut prioritizes the zones mainly as a means to prompt Israeli pullback or repositioning. From Lebanon's perspective, LAF troops and equipment establish visible presence, after which the IDF is expected to vacate additional territory. Officials can then claim obligations have been met.

A key shortcoming in this strategy is the limited discussion of Hezbollah by Beirut and its allies. The group is routinely avoided in public statements, much like a forbidden subject.

The United States pursues broader aims. Washington has long supported the Lebanese army and seeks to help the Lebanese state reclaim full authority over its territory.

US aim: restoring full Lebanese sovereignty

This requires the army to fulfill core military duties by securing land, guarding frontiers, curbing Hezbollah activity, and ensuring the state holds sole control over arms. In southern Lebanon, this requires addressing Hezbollah presence directly.

The pilot zone model supports a measured verification process. The LAF can prove effectiveness in one contained region by blocking Hezbollah reentry. Success here could allow expansion to further zones, eventually meeting Beirut's goal of nationwide sovereignty in the south.

Israel maintains a narrower focus shaped by prior events and regional realities. Jerusalem emphasizes keeping Hezbollah distant from the border and blocking reconstruction of facilities that once menaced northern communities. Israeli officials also doubt the LAF will directly challenge Hezbollah.

Even so, Israel may allow time for the pilot zone idea. Success could displace Hezbollah from the frontier without a lasting IDF footprint. Failure would let Israel inform Washington that Lebanon received a fair chance with unsatisfactory results.

This returns to the core issue. Beirut measures progress by IDF withdrawal rather than Hezbollah removal. Its statements stress redeployment over disarmament.

Similar patterns have repeated in the past.

Hezbollah: visible yet unaddressed

For years, UNIFIL and LAF presence served as cover in southern Lebanon. Hezbollah continued activities while officials claimed security through peacekeepers and army units.

The reasoning looped endlessly. UNIFIL operated, so Hezbollah was presumed absent. Reports showed no sightings, and LAF found nothing, allowing the assumption that the group held no role.

Meanwhile Hezbollah amassed extensive weaponry and built extensive facilities across the south, preparing for conflict with Israel. This arrangement persisted for years.

Today the pilot zones risk repeating this pattern of superficial coverage. LAF may display limited forces to claim progress, pressure may force IDF exit, and parties may announce victory while Hezbollah lingers out of sight.

Lebanon has long possessed formal institutions including an army, government, president, parliament, and security services. The real challenge stems from Iran-backed militants operating beyond these structures with independent military capabilities.

Pilot zones therefore require explicit success criteria. The focus must shift beyond IDF departure to post-redeployment control. Which entity governs the land? Who holds weapons? Can Hezbollah personnel return, rebuild sites, transport arms, or set up lookouts? Will the LAF intervene?

Should the Lebanese state secure territory and bar Hezbollah from reestablishing armed presence, the zones could signal genuine progress and the start of restored authority in the south.

Otherwise, if LAF deployment serves only as another layer of pretense, the underlying situation remains unchanged. Lebanon would simply substitute one form of superficial security for another.