A Second Shortcoming? Israel's Postponement of an October 7 Probe Is Unacceptable - Editorial

Every fresh document detailing Hamas preparations for the October 7 massacre sharpens the same unavoidable question: How could Israel overlook the buildup occurring right before its eyes?

The newest disclosures regarding Hamas leader Yahya Sinwar's scheme are chilling, not merely for what they reveal about Hamas but also for what they expose about Israel's inability to grasp the adversary it confronted.

Per the newly surfaced papers, Hamas considered deploying as many as 10,000 fighters against over 200 southern communities and IDF positions. The executed assault featured roughly 5,600 assailants in multiple waves.

That reality is nearly impossible to process. October 7 marked the deadliest attack on Jews since the Holocaust, claiming more than 1,200 lives and taking 251 hostages.

Yet these documents indicate Hamas envisioned an even greater operation, underscoring the magnitude of the oversight that demands examination. If October 7 represented not the full extent of Hamas planning but merely what it achieved, then Israel requires a far more thorough review than it has received so far.

For nearly three years, Israelis have endured the aftermath of the massacre without a complete national examination of its causes. Internal military reviews, State Comptroller reports, court disputes, Knesset proposals, and repeated pledges that a wider inquiry would follow have filled the interval.

Yet delay has turned into both strategy and protection, a means to push responsibility into the future until it fades. That approach cannot stand.

Oct. 7 Involved Broad Shortcomings

The shortcomings of October 7 reached far beyond any single unit, command center, intelligence judgment, perimeter barrier, or cabinet choice. They encompassed intelligence premises, political strategy, military positioning, deterrence concepts, frontier protection, and ties between elected leaders and security agencies.

No internal review alone can address all these elements. The High Court of Justice has already highlighted the issue's seriousness. More than two and a half years after the attack, no suitable body had been formed to probe the catastrophe and extract lessons.

The High Court curtailed the state comptroller's scope on key October 7 questions, including Israel's Hamas approach, Gaza border safeguards, intelligence processes, and actions by political, military, and Shin Bet leadership amid the assault.

That decision reinforced the need for a state commission of inquiry. This represents a fundamental duty of the state to its people, one owed to all.

A state commission would establish facts, pinpoint failures, assign responsibility appropriately, and help ensure Israel avoids repeating the misconceptions that preceded the prior disaster.

This explains why current political efforts to craft an alternative inquiry structure are so concerning. An October 7 investigation cannot originate within the same political arena it must scrutinize. A panel shaped by politicians lacks the authority of an independent state commission formed under established law.

Israel now approaches an election period. On October 27, voters will head to the polls more than three years after the bloodiest day in Jewish history since the Holocaust. Parties will campaign on security, leadership, unity, responsibility, hostages, war, religion, living costs, and influence.

Before politicians seek fresh mandates, however, the public has a straightforward question for them: How can leaders request to govern again when the state has yet to properly examine how its officials failed so gravely before?

Oct. 7 Probe Must Lead the Next Government's Agenda

If a state commission of inquiry is not launched before the vote, then creating one must rank among the first steps of the incoming government. Right away.

The October 7 massacre constituted both a Hamas terrorist incursion and a breakdown of Israel's core pledge to safeguard its citizens.

Hamas planned, prepared, misled, and attacked. Israel must now investigate, learn, fix, and accept responsibility. Anything short of that would amount to a second failure.