This piece draws from private discussions with high-ranking current and former officials in the Mossad and IDF who wished to remain unnamed, and it received clearance from the Israeli censor.

On Tuesday, David Barnea wrapped up his remarkable five-year stint heading the Mossad. In that period, he elevated the intelligence service from handling isolated covert missions to a powerful force capable of shaping conflicts and diplomacy across several Middle Eastern arenas, spanning Iran, Hezbollah in Lebanon, and safeguarding Jewish communities from attacks abroad.

With decades inside the organization and five years in charge during some of Israel's most defining times, he contributed to weakening Iran through the efforts of numerous agents who disrupted the nation in June 2025. This included the September 2024 pager explosions that eliminated Hezbollah members, and that month he directed the targeted killing of Hezbollah leader Hassan Nasrallah in Lebanon.

Barnea also shares important perspectives on what lies ahead for the area.

Fresh details emerge about Lebanese Mossad operatives who braved intense danger to install key equipment for the Nasrallah operation

Lebanese Mossad operatives braved extreme risks to eliminate Nasrallah

On September 27, 2024, roughly ten days following the pager blasts, numerous F-15I jets from the IDF 69th squadron struck Hezbollah's hidden command center in Beirut's Dahiya district. They released 85 munitions, resulting in the death of Hassan Nasrallah.

Nasrallah, who led Hezbollah for over thirty years, perished with about twenty of his military leaders, among them Ali Karaki, head of the southern sector, who had been named the new military commander after Israel eliminated the prior one.

A decade of careful intelligence gathering by the IDF and Mossad, partly from Iranians linked to Hezbollah, brought matters to this stage.

Earlier, reports indicated that the IDF benefited from targeting tools placed by Mossad personnel in exact spots within the structure above Nasrallah's bunker.

Now the Post can disclose for the first time that, similar to actions in Iran, many of these personnel were local Lebanese Mossad recruits rather than standard Israeli operatives as in earlier eras.

The Post can further reveal that these agents often proceeded straight into zones the IDF had struck just moments earlier. This step was required at times to assess strike outcomes and to reach spots for planting the devices used against Nasrallah. As they advanced, additional IDF strikes continued.

At Mossad and IDF command centers, Barnea and air force leaders coordinated closely to avoid striking their own Lebanese agents moving through these battle areas to position equipment. The operatives advanced amid smoke, flames, and chaotic conditions, hoping to evade both IDF fire and Hezbollah detection.

Barnea required precise knowledge of the bunker's location, Nasrallah's exact position inside it, and any shifts from ongoing IDF strikes on a moment-by-moment basis.

The departing Mossad head regards these agents as exceptional individuals with extraordinary courage.

In 2025, these agents and the Mossad were awarded the Israel Prize for their intelligence work and successes, even as their names stay secret.

Potential Kurdish actions versus the Islamic regime and the reasons Trump blocked the effort

Why Trump halted a Kurdish push against the Islamic regime

Those familiar with Barnea note that the US originated the concept of using Kurds to topple the Islamic regime via an internal ground advance. In fact, back in 2003, Americans had already partnered with Kurds in operations that helped remove Saddam Hussein from Iraq.

These sources highlighted that many of the same Kurds from that historic push into Baghdad, including Massoud Barzani who first entered Hussein's palace, were the ones Israel sought to mobilize against Iran's Islamic regime.

Both Iraqi and Iranian Kurds possess strong combat skills without needing extra preparation, per the sources. Deploying them in the 2026 conflict would have spared the US from sending and risking its own troops on the ground.

In this sense, Israeli sources saw the approach as more acceptable to Washington.

Remarkably, Israel stood ready to supply the Kurds not only with air cover but also sustained aerial support to counter any Iranian units attempting to halt their advance.

Arms provided to the Kurds by the US and Mossad, many repurposed from captures by the IDF from Hamas in Gaza or Hezbollah in Lebanon, along with Israeli training, prepared the fighters for action.

Opinions differ on whether US President Donald Trump was persuaded to block the plan by his own advisors or by Turkish President Recep Tayyip Erdogan.

Even inside Israel, some questioned if the effort would succeed. Yet Mossad personnel and those close to Barnea stressed that most agency missions demand belief, and they have already achieved feats that defied expectations.

Although CIA director John Ratcliff reportedly opposed the Kurdish move, Mossad sources indicate he never expressed opposition directly to Israelis. They also point to public accounts of the CIA arming the Kurds, suggesting the agency took steps that could have supported the plan.

Israeli sources have blamed certain American White House officials, often naming US Vice President JD Vance who expressed reservations about the 2026 Iran conflict, for sharing the details with Erdogan to enable him to reach Trump and halt the operation in time.

Barnea's perspective on regime change from his talk with Trump onward

When Barnea addressed Trump via video on February 12, he avoided claiming the Iranian regime would collapse right away. Instead, he projected that regime change might require a year or longer after the war ended, though the conflict, featuring a Kurdish ground component, would greatly improve prospects for such an outcome. In Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu's remarks at Barnea's farewell event, the leader echoed comparable points. Barnea's core argument centered on shaking the regime's foundations.

Indeed, the IDF began striking Iranian regime and Basij units in Kurdish regions, as announced. Yet while the IDF later claimed all critical and essential targets were hit, the Post learned that perhaps only about 10 percent of the sites intended to aid Kurds against Iranian regime forces received strikes.

These targets fell outside the main operation counts since they belonged to a distinct war phase that did not fully launch. Under this concept, around eight million Kurds plus other groups like Sunnis and Baluchis could have joined the regime change drive like a cascade.

Per Barnea's outlook, if Trump maintains firm pressure through financial, sea, diplomatic, and military means, and he expects the US leader will, then the regime could fall within a year. Still, in Barnea's assessment, if Trump lifts economic sanctions or his counter-blockade in the Strait of Hormuz before a full agreement on major issues, then the strategies of Israel, the CIA, and the Mossad would lose much of their impact.

In that event, the Islamic regime would gain fresh resources and regain strength. This would extend to the wider population within one to two years, easing internal calls for regime change.

Under this path, while the Islamic regime might still be overthrown, the Post understands Barnea would see it as far harder, needing an entirely new strategy.

Who leads Iran now: Mojtaba Khamenei, IRGC head Vahidi, or several civilian figures?

One ongoing question under constant review is who holds decision-making power in Iran following Ayatollah Ali Khamenei's assassination on February 28.

Mossad sources maintain that the ayatollah's son, Mojtaba, holds true authority.

The extent of Mojtaba's injuries from the same strike that killed his father, and whether they affect his speech, remains unclear.

Yet broad consensus holds that Mojtaba has taken on the supreme leader role fully. The Post has also gathered that since at least mid-April, this matches the assessment of Israeli military intelligence, despite occasional differing media accounts.

Regarding occasional claims questioning Mojtaba's control, Israeli defense sources view them as efforts to prompt quicker replies from Mojtaba to American proposals amid frustration over his delayed responses.

Why have the US and Israel avoided striking the Pickaxe Mountain nuclear site?

Although US strikes in June 2025 destroyed the Fordow nuclear site under a mountain, the Iranians showed they could excavate even deeper, to depths where even American bunker-busting munitions, which Israel lacks, would fail.

The Post first noted in 2021 that Iran was constructing the Pickaxe Mountain nuclear site even deeper than Fordow. While the facility is not yet seen as active, the Post has now confirmed from top US and Israeli sources the worries over the challenges of aerial destruction.

Leading American and Israeli figures regard Pickaxe Mountain, along with the 60 percent uranium buried under rubble at Iran's nuclear sites, as among the top remaining nuclear risks if it activates and Iran shifts key assets there, creating a kind of immunity zone.

Trump has stated publicly that he opposes sending large US ground troops into Iran to eliminate Pickaxe Mountain or secure the 60 percent uranium. He prefers his current talks with Iran to achieve removal or dilution of the uranium plus an Iranian commitment to halt enrichment at all sites, including Pickaxe Mountain if not destroyed, under strict oversight.

Although the US conducted a ground rescue over several days for two downed American pilots in Iran, the Post understands top US generals have urged Trump against attempting a ground effort to seize the uranium. They assess it could last months, prove far riskier, and expose many more American troops to threats.

Why did the Mossad skip its own ground mission to disrupt Iran's nuclear program?

Why did the Mossad forgo a major ground effort to sabotage Iran's nuclear sites, including Fordow? What shifted the lead to the air force in June 2025?

Prior reports noted that during late April and early May 2024 meetings involving Netanyahu, the Mossad, and senior IDF leaders, a significant development occurred.

For years, Netanyahu had assigned the Mossad primary responsibility for countering the Iranian nuclear danger.

A possible plan also existed for the Mossad to launch an unmatched broad operation to destroy most of Iran's nuclear capabilities at once, including Fordow.