ByYONAH JEREMY BOB

JUNE 9, 2026 16:00

Updated: JUNE 9, 2026 16:05

The State Comptroller's report issued on Tuesday showed that over 10,000 Palestinians were held in Israeli facilities from October 2023 to January 2025, representing a 92 percent rise during the Gaza counter-invasion.

Comptroller Matanyahu Englman, whose term ends next month, noted that neither the Israel Prisons Service nor the IDF had sufficient preparations for the long-term detention of large numbers of Gazans.

Without prior theoretical plans or estimates for arrest volumes in a prolonged conflict, the lack of preparation resulted in premature releases of senior Hamas figures while hostages remained in Gaza, according to the findings.

On November 23, 2023, the IDF took into custody the director of Shifa Hospital, Muhammad Abu Salmiya, due to extensive coordination with Hamas operatives who operated from the medical site.

The case of the release of Abu Samiya

The report highlights the July 1, 2024 release of Abu Samiya along with 18 other senior Hamas figures at different stages as particularly concerning.

Englman stated that releasing prisoners who posed risks to Israeli security without immediate notification to the prime minister warrants serious attention.

The Jerusalem Post recognizes that Abu Samiya's release involved greater complexity than the comptroller's summary indicates.

Shin Bet sources informed the Post during 2024 that the political leadership and cabinet had overlooked severe prison overcrowding and temporary field facilities for months.

Lacking cabinet direction, adequate resources, and available cells, the IPS, IDF, and Shin Bet resorted to numerous improvised measures, many of which proved less than ideal.

Sde Teiman field detention facility

The creation of the large temporary IDF site at Sde Teiman drew High Court criticism for multiple infringements on detainee rights.

One IDF prison guard was found guilty of prisoner mistreatment, five others faced charges in the Sde Teiman matter that were later dropped due to prosecution errors affecting the guards' trial rights rather than lack of proof, while additional cases remain under review.

These detainee rights concerns damaged Israel's international standing, as outlets including the New York Times published extensive reports on the mistreatment well before IDF legal involvement.

The report omits these matters since it examined only IPS facilities, though the rationale for that limit remains unclear.

Without the High Court's mid-2024 action, the Sde Teiman issues might have persisted without resolution.

Sources close to the IDF Military Advocate General Yifat Tomer Yerushalmi indicated to the Post that she had sought to shut down the facility sooner without success.

The report centers on mistakes by the IPS, IDF, and Shin Bet that compromised security through releases of individuals who should have remained detained longer.

While the Shin Bet cited insufficient political guidance, a position with which comptroller sources agree, those sources also maintain that the agency should have pursued a direct appeal to Netanyahu on the Abu Samiya matter given the wartime circumstances.

In isolation, the Shin Bet decision to free Abu Samiya may have been appropriate since he was not a violent operative and posed no direct physical threat.

After holding him for seven months without a clear indictment path, freeing him to accommodate more dangerous prisoners was understandable.

Yet with Hamas still holding Israeli hostages and gaining propaganda value from Abu Samiya's uncompensated return, comptroller sources argued the Shin Bet should have arranged a special consultation with Netanyahu.

The influx of arrests slowed down the whole process

The report further stated that inadequate preparation by the IDF and IPS for the sudden large-scale detentions impaired the Shin Bet's capacity for subsequent arrests and questioning.

Put simply, without space for new detainees, the Shin Bet faced limits on conducting arrests and interrogations.

The comptroller added that overcrowding of Gazan prisoners in IPS sites endangered staff.

The report does not mention that such conditions might have raised the likelihood of prisoner mistreatment by IPS personnel.

On figures, the comptroller reported pre-war totals of 16,200 prisoners including 5,200 security prisoners rising to 23,400 total and over 10,000 security prisoners by early 2025.

The actual number of Palestinians detained by the IDF could reach 30,000, though the comptroller provided no data on thousands of security prisoners freed in the war's first half due to space shortages or weak evidence.

The cabinet also freed around 3,000 security prisoners via three hostage agreements signed between 2023 and October 2025.

Regarding capacity, the maximum allowable prisoners in October 2023 stood near 14,500 based on available cell space.

By early 2025, space was lacking for 3,502 security prisoners plus thousands of non-security inmates.

As of February 2025, 2,366 Palestinian security prisoners remained in IDF cells, an extended improper arrangement per the comptroller and legal officials.

The comptroller omits updated mid-2026 figures, but the Post understands numbers remain very high including administrative detentions, though new arrest rates declined markedly in 2025 as combat intensity decreased.

Fewer Hamas fighters surrendered in 2025, and IDF sources noted greater difficulty securing prisoners when fighters emerged unexpectedly from tunnels near positions, a notable pattern that year.

No trials yet for October 7 terrorists

Englman also faulted the absence of any trials to date for Hamas terrorists linked to the war.

However, the government only authorized funding for October 7 indictments and trials last week on June 4.

Until October 2025, the government postponed all such actions fearing the need to exchange many security prisoners for hostages, which ultimately occurred.

This delay blocked the state prosecutor from advancing any cases.

When the government approved over one billion shekels on June 4 to prosecute October 7 participants, it marked the first allocation to transfer cases from state to military prosecution.

Legislation enabling prosecution of October 7 terrorists passed in May, authorizing the death penalty and public trials at a new Jerusalem military court still to be constructed.

The law sets out a broad structure for conducting the trials.

The Defense and Finance Ministries confirmed that the over one billion shekel framework covers 2026-2029 with allocations directed to the Defense Ministry and IDF.

The approved budget supports construction of multiple facilities to enact the law, the ministries stated.

Infrastructure includes a court complex, prosecution offices, and an IDF headquarters building.

Until construction finishes, new prosecutors and judges are recruited, a process that may require months or years, the cases will likely stay on hold.

Without detailing these points, the comptroller concluded that trying Hamas terrorists from October 7 and the Iron Swords War holds decisive legal, ethical, and public relations importance, delivering justice to the victims.

The Post had not yet received responses from the IDF, IPS, and Shin Bet at press time.