Amir Baram has witnessed nearly every facet of military service.

Over 38 years he has held roles in the IDF and now as director-general of the Defense Ministry.

Baram has been posted or engaged in combat across Lebanon, Gaza, and the West Bank, including hidden operations deep in hostile territory.

Though shorter than many senior Israeli officers, his firm principles, broad command of defense topics, and quiet assurance emerge right away.

A self-described independent voice at times, Baram restored full brigade parachute drills in 2012 and led the first complete jump exercise in 15 years.

Yet his toughest assignment arrived when he took the top non-political post in the Defense Ministry early in 2025 and has traveled the globe since to safeguard Israel's defense priorities amid the toughest diplomatic climate in decades.

US-MOU

Baram heads negotiations for Israel's next memorandum of understanding with the US that will turn a defense aid deal into a full partnership covering 2028-2038.

He no longer must plead for support to a small Israel, a nation that has become a regional economic leader.

At the same time, Baram lacks any clear template for building this fresh partnership because earlier MOUs since the 1980s focused only on aid.

Timing plays a key role in the MOU.

Israel has sought to speed talks with the Trump administration, starting with a planned return visit by officials last week, yet that trip was postponed without a new date.

Even with Israeli attempts to move forward, the slow pace leaves it uncertain whether a renewed MOU can be reached before a new US Congress begins in January.

For decades the MOU, renewed and revised every ten years, served as the main strategic text guiding US military help and ties with Israel.

If no MOU is signed by January, any later accord could meet stronger resistance from a likely Democrat-led House and possibly Senate.

The continuing Iran conflict and other matters have again delayed even basic discussions on the deal.

On April 16, 40 of 47 Democratic senators backed blocking certain weapon sales to Israel. On July 15, 103 of 212 House Democrats backed a budget change to stop the $3.3 billion in yearly foreign military funds set for Israel.

With this backdrop, a shift in control of one or both US chambers could affect the MOU, though the executive branch can still act alone on some foreign policy steps.

Israel once expected talks to advance steadily from early 2026, but the Iran war pushed that back to April, with hopes for faster progress in May.

The uncertain period after the Iran war and the Lebanon conflict appear to have drawn US attention elsewhere.

The delay may also reflect changed American views on military support or partnerships with Israel, which have shifted sharply in recent years.

Israel had aimed to finalize the MOU before its own elections and before US midterms. The best remaining chance may now be signing after both votes but before the new Congress starts, though even that looks unlikely.

It is still less clear if Israel can secure a long-term overlapping defense accord through 2048.

This doubt shows in ministry documents that also note the option of handling Israel-US defense ties on a case-by-case basis without long-term anchors.

Weapons Independence and Debate on Longer Wars

This is not the only major topic Baram must handle.

He is also building an MOU that fits Israel's new plan to make both standard and precision bombs in far greater numbers than before.

The drive for more locally made bombs aims to increase independence and support a shift toward readiness for extended conflicts.

Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu has pledged $350 billion over ten years to reach greater weapons self-reliance.

Baram must secure those funds from the Finance Ministry, which will likely seek cuts, and decide how best to spend them.

He must also keep the defense community aligned with the new approach.

A growing number of former senior officials have criticized the length of recent wars and called for a return to shorter ones.

They argue Israel remains too limited in size, population, economy, and diplomatic backing to sustain long fights.

On July 1, Baram publicly rejected that view as unrealistic and stated the IDF must prepare for extended wars no matter the difficulty.

This does not rule out efforts to end future wars sooner than the post-October 7 conflicts, but Baram insists Israel must retain the ability to keep fighting longer if needed.

He is also not optimistic about long gaps between wars in the near term.

Back in September 2025, only months after the June 2025 Iran war, Baram accurately forecast another clash with Tehran at a Finance Ministry event, saying the prior operation ended in clear victory yet more confrontations with Iran remain certain.

The Iranian regime, stung by strategic setback, is pouring resources into security systems and rapid force growth, he noted.

Other Allies

The US remains the central element of foreign defense policy, and Baram oversees that relationship.

One area showing a troubling change is Europe.

Sales of Israeli defense items to Europe stay solid in many fields, with the Arrow 3 deal to Germany setting new records.

Yet overall sales to Europe fell between 2024 and 2025.

Defense sources say the drop stems mainly from an unusually high 2024 tied to the Arrow sale and a few other large deals, while figures compared with 2023 stayed steady.

Sources note this holds even though many European nations, especially France, have sent mixed messages on buying from or selling to Israel due to differences over Gaza, Lebanon, and Iran.

Another challenge exists.

Since Russia's invasion of Ukraine, Kyiv has become one of the most creative makers of new defense tools and matches or exceeds Israel in battle testing for some systems.

Moreover, while few European countries once spent heavily on their own defense industries, many have since expanded those sectors after Russia kept pressuring Ukraine and Europe, reducing the need for Israeli weapons.

Even when Israeli products rank higher, some nations now choose local options that are adequate and lower in cost.

Regarding France, the Defense Ministry stated in June that Paris was partly boycotting Israel's defense sector over concerns tied to the Middle East wars.

The ministry also charged that the French military sought to weaken Israel as a rival in several defense fields.

French President Emmanuel Macron stopped French weapons shipments to Israel in late 2024 over the Gaza war's humanitarian impact. For three years France has blocked or limited Israeli defense firms at arms shows in the country.

The Post asked top defense sources whether Israel can sustain open friction with France, including canceling a senior French defense visit in response to the partial boycott.

Some sources offered a longer view of possible French decline, noting France's Muslim population near 10 percent and projected to near 20 percent by 2050 amid low birth rates among non-Muslim citizens.

Most French Muslims lean against Israel and sometimes the West, and combined with large budget shortfalls this has sparked fresh debate on whether France remains governable.

In March, Baram said he had chosen to cut all defense buys from France to zero and replace them with Israeli-made items or purchases from other allies.

Can the defense industry hold steady if it faces pushback from France and several other European states?

Various Eastern European and other nations still conduct major defense trade with Israel.

Under Baram, Israel has also widened ties with India, Greece, Cyprus, and the UAE.

While Israeli-Indian links once centered on Jerusalem selling systems such as the Barak 8, the new MOU with India has opened or supported fresh contracts.

These cover Rafael SPICE 1000 guidance kits and Ice Breaker naval cruise missiles, Elbit Rampage air-to-ground missiles, and Israel Aerospace Industries supersonic Air LORA missiles.

Baram has used the new Israel-India MOU as a base for a broader shift in ties between the two nations.

The aim is to move from a simple buyer-seller model toward joint production and technology work across the full life of new weapons systems.

Ahead of Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi's visit to Israel earlier this year, the government approved a $40 million program to grow bilateral work across sectors.

It later approved joint development of next-generation technologies and emergency procurement steps during conflicts.

A Forbes India report noted Israel agreed to $8.6 billion in arms deals with India in 2026, following earlier ministry figures showing roughly $20.5 billion in total sales from 2020 to 2024.

Local production of Rafael Tamir interceptors in India would mark another step toward deeper shared industrial output.

Sources close to Baram say Israel is prepared to share top secrets with India because, after the May 2024 partial US weapons embargo, Israeli defense policy needs extra anchors built on deep, shared, long-term interests.

This does not imply any cut in sharing with the US.

In fact, Baram's position holds that a transfer of strategic technology to America in select defense fields is vital to gaining Trump administration and future support for sharing US superiority in AI.

While many view Israel as a cybersecurity leader, it entered the AI race later than the US, China, and others and holds fewer energy, land, and other resources needed to reach even mid-level AI strength.