This period, labeled global rupture by Mark Carney, is commonly viewed through the lens of jungle rules where power dictates outcomes and weaker parties endure consequences, as global norms erode and international bodies lose influence. Russia's actions in Ukraine, Israel's operations in Gaza, and strikes by the US and Israel on Iran and Lebanon appear to reinforce such pessimism. Yet a closer look at these conflicts points toward more constructive paths ahead.

Russia, previously regarded as a strong military force, anticipated a swift victory over Ukraine, a smaller nation supported by a fragmented and cautious western alliance. Following the shift to prolonged fighting, many assumed Ukraine faced inevitable defeat. That view has changed.

Admittedly, Russia has disregarded international rules and holds advantages in military strength and population size. Admittedly, Donald Trump's US has turned away from Ukraine, and although European backing stays firm, it falls short of needs. Still, Ukraine holds its ground.

In the Middle East, the US and Israel launched two assaults on Iran, again breaching established legal standards. European officials, at first hesitant to address legality, later confirmed the violations. Power dynamics were clear: the leading global military force joined by Israel, seeking regional dominance, targeted Iran amid its domestic unrest and crackdowns. Benjamin Netanyahu persuaded Trump that additional pressure would collapse the Iranian system rapidly.

Four months afterward, the US and the Iranian authorities, now featuring younger and more assertive leadership, reached a memorandum of understanding that reopened the strait of Hormuz. Iranian oversight of the passage gains practical acceptance, previously frozen funds may resume movement, and oil restrictions face temporary suspension while nuclear talks restart. The agreement represented the best outcome Trump could achieve, yet it fell short for the US and Israel, drawing growing criticism at home. This does not change the underlying recognition that superior forces did not achieve full success.

Both conflicts involve serious breaches of international standards while showing that even leading actors can encounter setbacks.

Will Europe, which backed Kyiv and legal principles yet showed inconsistency regarding the Middle East, seize this opportunity to reinforce its dedication to global rules? Two positive developments stand out.

A group of roughly 40 nations, coordinated by France and the UK, formed a taskforce for the strait of Hormuz to remove mines and protect shipping routes. This effort reflects Europe's readiness for practical involvement. It revives collaborative approaches by engaging diverse participants outside direct conflict zones. It also establishes that any action would rest on legal foundations and include coordination with shoreline countries, starting with Iran.

The mission may not advance. Similar to proposals for a reassurance force in Ukraine following a potential truce, the Hormuz group serves largely to address US positions, signaling to Washington that European states, though unwilling to engage in combat, stand prepared to support stability afterward. Trump has dismissed such gestures, including at the G7 summit in Evian. Iran moreover opposes European naval presence in the strait. Absent consent from Tehran, European officials recognize that no deployment will occur.

A separate European effort, more tangible in nature, has developed steadily. Norway, with established standing in the Middle East through early and clear condemnation of the conflict, similar to Spain, brings both trust and knowledge of maritime regulations. The UN convention on the law of the sea has gained ratification from most nations, though the US, Israel and Iran remain among the exceptions.

Encouragingly, despite not being signatories, the US and Iran both seek to align with its provisions in the strait. Norway has offered key guidance to Iran and Oman, along with mediators from Pakistan and Qatar, to keep arrangements consistent with the convention's emphasis on open navigation. Such understated, practical assistance allows Europeans to rebuild trust and contribute effectively in the area.

European standing suffers most regarding the Israeli-Palestinian situation, where, as in Lebanon, expressions of worry over Israel's conduct have not led to concrete steps. Israel's disregard for legal norms appears starkest, with no accountability for war crimes, crimes against humanity or potential genocide in Gaza. European governments have contributed to shielding Israel from its obligations.

Yet shifts may lie ahead. EU measures targeting extremist Israeli ministers Itamar Ben-Gvir and Bezalel Smotrich will not materialize due to the need for full consensus. Accountability should target the state itself rather than specific officials.

A stronger step, clarified by the EU legal service as requiring only a qualified majority, involves prohibiting imports from unlawful Israeli settlements in the occupied West Bank. Most member states already favor this approach. Others, such as Italy, previously resistant, now indicate openness. Germany stands as the sole major holdout, claiming that restricting settlement trade echoes past discrimination. This position lacks merit, drawing an inappropriate parallel between current settlements and the persecution of Jews in 1930s Germany.

Pressure continues to build. The EU high representative, Kaja Kallas, responding to most member governments, has requested that the European Commission prepare a formal proposal. Commission president Ursula von der Leyen might still delay action. The case against ongoing trade with illegal settlements remains evident. Instead of resisting, Europe would benefit from aligning once more with established rules.

Nathalie Tocci is a Guardian Europe columnist

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