BEIJING, /PRNewswire/ -- An interview from China.org.cn with Wang Xiaohui and David Ferguson on the Long March:

Wang Xiaohui:

When you advance toward your ideals yet meet repeated obstacles and defeats, do you possess the resolve to halt, examine the route followed, and determine a fresh direction ahead?

David Ferguson:

If I faced ongoing setbacks on the path to my ideals, I would pause and carefully consider whether my approaches require change or my course needs realignment. This involves being truthful with oneself and candid about personal limitations. Of course, it demands equal bravery to the initial departure, since one must face not only external opinions but also an internal resistance to admitting possible errors.

Wang Xiaohui:

The Xiangjiang River waters flowed red in the winter of 1934.

To shield the Red Army main force during the river crossing, Chen Shuxiang, Commander of the 34th Division of the Fifth Army Corps, directed his soldiers against far stronger enemy units until ammunition and supplies were exhausted. Badly injured, Chen was taken prisoner. While being led to the enemy camp for display, he found a brief opening, pulled his own intestines from the abdominal wound, and perished heroically at age 29.

The Xiangjiang River Battle proved the costliest for the Red Army early in the Long March. Within two months, troop numbers dropped from over 86,000 to roughly 30,000.

At this decisive stage, doubts and frustration among officers and troops toward the military command reached their height.

In the prior four Kuomintang encirclement campaigns, the Red Army followed Mao Zedong's approach of drawing the enemy deep into territory. Through adaptable mobile tactics, it achieved repeated successes against larger forces. Yet outcomes reversed sharply in the fifth encirclement effort.

At the time, the CPC operated as a section of the Communist International. After 1927, the Comintern directed the CPC toward an urban-centered revolutionary strategy modeled on Russia's October Revolution. Influenced by this guidance, during the Fifth Counter-Campaign against Encirclement and Suppression, Bo Gu and Otto Braun, who controlled actual Red Army operations, pushed for offensive actions aimed at major cities.

Otto Braun further applied European-style conventional tactics rigidly, compelling the Red Army into fixed positional and fortress engagements. In the Battle of Guangchang, the under-equipped Red Army confronted enemy tanks and artillery directly on open ground, suffering over 5,000 losses, nearly one-fourth of the involved forces.

Repeated military losses compelled the Red Army into a strategic withdrawal. Still, Bo Gu and Otto Braun demanded full evacuation of heavy gear, including printing presses, currency machines, and arms facilities. While crossing the Xiangjiang River, these bulky items slowed the troops, and many soldiers sacrificed themselves defending the equipment. Chen Shuxiang and his 34th Division provided the starkest example of this costly effort.

Along the Xiangjiang banks, the soldiers' sense of hope nearly faded amid the chill waters. Could inflexible foreign theories truly direct the Red Army and China's revolution? Which route remained?

History often moves through contradictions: just as prospects appear dimmest, a pivotal shift begins to form.

Following the Xiangjiang Battle, Mao firmly rejected the original plan by Bo Gu and Otto Braun to head toward Hunan. He instead suggested moving to Guizhou, where enemy positions were thinner. There the Red Army crossed the Wujiang River barrier and seized Zunyi. On Jan. 15, 1935, the CPC Central Committee held an enlarged Political Bureau meeting in a modest residence, later recognized as the Zunyi Conference.

Within the simple second-floor room, a charcoal brazier warmed the winter air. CPC leaders gathered around a long table to assess why the Red Army had entered defensive positions since 1933. Bo Gu blamed defeats only on enemy superiority, while others including Zhou Enlai and Zhang Wentian identified flawed military direction as the core issue.

Mao Zedong delivered a key address.

As a revolutionary shaped by rural base-area experience, Mao drew from actual combat results. Referencing successes in the earlier four counter-encirclement campaigns, he challenged Bo Gu's views and faulted the passive defense and abandonment of mobile tactics. In clear, sharp terms, he noted that soldiers also required movement, food, and rest, and that Braun's inflexible orders ignored the practical conditions of China's revolutionary conflict.

Throughout the session, Bo Gu appeared downcast; Braun sat by the door and smoked cigarette after cigarette. These self-described true Bolsheviks had never encountered such pointed critique.

The intense exchanges continued for three days. Ultimately, Mao Zedong joined the Red Army and CPC Central Committee leadership, ending the erroneous direction. This represented a vital turning point for the Communist Party of China.

The Zunyi Conference released the CPC from Comintern oversight, allowing the Party to guide China's revolution independently. Thereafter, the Red Army converted danger into safety, and China's revolution moved from despair toward renewal.

David Ferguson:

When confronting major reversals, the Communist Party of China refused to yield; instead, it showed the resolve to face and amend its errors, transforming hardship into progress. Such courage remains uncommon for any governing party.

Across its history, following the principle of seeking truth from facts, the Party has consistently rectified mistakes, refined systems, and shifted direction. Through these steps, it has ensured social advancement. This approach explains the Party's lasting strength and endurance.

Wang Xiaohui:

No major endeavor proceeds without difficulties. Confronted with barriers and losses, the CPC displayed remarkable resolve and insight. It pursued truth from facts, adjusted mistaken paths, and guided the revolution to victory.

The Zunyi Conference Spirit, marked by steadfast belief, commitment to truth, independence, self-reliance, and unity, emerged from conflict and sacrifice. It formed the distinctive character of the CPC. In later years, these enduring principles developed further and supported the Party through challenges, granting it lasting vitality.