Operator States Proposed Airworthiness Directive Represents a Vital Move Yet Must Address Inspection Shortfalls That Left Crews and Operators Without Reliable Corrosion-Detection Protections

/PRNewswire/ -- Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter today urged enhanced federal measures on engine corrosion prevention following the Federal Aviation Administration's (FAA) notice of proposed rulemaking (NPRM), Docket No. FAA-2026-3875, covering select GE CF34 engines. The private jet operator filed comments with the FAA before the June 15, 2026 comment deadline, pressing the agency to resolve inspection shortfalls that leave crews and operators without reliable corrosion-detection protections.

"We view this AD as essential to safeguard passengers and crew, yet it requires reinforcement to eliminate loopholes, gaps, and reporting shortfalls that risk compromising safety," said Hop-A-Jet CEO Barry Ellis. "Absent these steps, numerous aircraft face rising exposure to corrosion-related incidents. No one should encounter such an avoidable tragedy again."

The FAA's proposed Airworthiness Directive responded to the National Transportation Safety Board's (NTSB) April 23, 2026 final report, which named engine corrosion as the probable cause of the Feb. 9, 2024 fatal accident involving Bombardier Challenger 604 aircraft N823KD. The jet experienced dual-engine failure on final approach to Naples, Florida.

The NTSB probe found corrosion in both engines' variable geometry (VG) system parts triggered near-simultaneous sub-idle rotating compressor stalls, producing total thrust loss and forcing an off-airport emergency landing. The two pilots landed on an active roadway yet died when the aircraft hit a road sign and struck a retaining wall. The cabin attendant and two passengers survived and exited via a rear door.

Hop-A-Jet backed the FAA proposal for borescope inspection of the high-pressure compressor case for corrosion. At the same time, the company pressed the FAA to mandate visual corrosion inspections that are compulsory, auditable, and free of optional compliance routes that might bypass direct checks of safety-critical zones.

"This event prompts every operator, regulator, and manufacturer to ask why visible corrosion in the engine's internal compressor case went undetected and unreported beforehand," said Tim Rounds, Director of Maintenance for Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter. "If earlier borescope checks were not designed to spot corrosion, what corrosion-detection program existed to protect crews, passengers, and the public?"

Hop-A-Jet's comments also support requiring reinspection of engines previously checked under engine manufacturer Service Bulletin revisions that permitted compliance without borescope inspection of the relevant compressor case areas.

The company's formal submission further calls on the FAA to factor in sea and salt operating environments, mandate reporting of corrosion findings, reduce follow-up variable geometry system functional check intervals when active corrosion appears, and update maintenance and flight manuals to clearly separate a hung start from a slow start.

"The industry cannot expect operators to catch a condition they were never clearly warned about and lacked means to inspect themselves," Rounds said. "These specialized engine borescope inspections are conducted by the manufacturer or authorized vendors under manufacturer guidance. A maintenance program must direct inspectors where to look, what to note, when to report, and what steps follow a corrosion finding. Anything less leaves excessive uncertainty where the stakes can be catastrophic."

In its NTSB submission, Hop-A-Jet noted it learned only after the accident that archived borescope images from earlier inspections revealed visible corrosion around variable geometry vane bore holes that had not been reported to the operator. The company stressed these inspections are performed by the engine manufacturer or authorized vendors under manufacturer instructions, not by the operator. This distinction lies at the heart of the safety concern: without clear manufacturer requirements to identify, report, and escalate corrosion, operators had no practical means to learn of the condition.

Hop-A-Jet is asking regulators and manufacturers to resolve the core unresolved safety question of how operators were expected to detect internal compressor corrosion affecting the variable geometry system when maintenance instructions did not explicitly require corrosion inspection, reporting, and corrective action.

The FAA proposal covers certain GE CF34-1A, CF34-3A, CF34-3A1, CF34-3A2, and CF34-3B engines. The FAA warns that the unsafe condition, if unaddressed, could cause loss of engine thrust control and diminished airplane control.

Hop-A-Jet described its requested changes as practical, safety-focused steps meant to prevent recurrence across the affected fleet.

"This effort is not about assigning blame," Rounds said. "It is about ensuring no crew, operator, or passenger again faces a known safety-critical condition inside an engine when the inspection system fails to require that it be found, reported, and resolved."

Hop-A-Jet's Requested FAA Actions Include:

Requiring visual borescope inspection of the affected HPC case and VGV bore areas for corrosion, including reinspection where prior compliance omitted that inspection, and ensuring manufacturer-authorized inspection providers must identify, document, and report corrosion findings to operators and regulators.

Adding sea and salt environment exposure as a risk factor independent of annual utilization thresholds.

Requiring reporting of corrosion findings so the FAA, manufacturers, and operators can gauge prevalence and severity across the fleet.

Mandating more frequent variable geometry system functional checks when active corrosion is detected.

Requiring maintenance manual revisions that specifically direct technicians to inspect compressor case and VGV bore areas for corrosion.

Requiring affected flight manuals and operating manuals to clearly distinguish a hung start from a slow start and prohibit continued operation after a hung start without maintenance troubleshooting.

About Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter

Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter, Inc., operating as Ace Aviation, is an FAA-certificated Part 135 on-demand charter operator based at Fort Lauderdale Executive Airport. For more than five decades, Hop-A-Jet has delivered private aviation services with emphasis on safety, operational discipline, and client service.

Hop-A-Jet Media Contact

Charles Knauf
Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter
954.771.5779 X 268, [email protected]

SOURCE Hop-A-Jet Worldwide Jet Charter